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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EQUALIZATION TRANSFER 
UNDER A DECENTRALIZED CONTEXT: THE CASE OF PERUVIAN 
MUNICIPALITIES 
BY 
LINDA JANET PORRAS-MENDOZA 
MAY, 2018 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Public Management and Policy 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays that examine the efficiency and equity 
implications of a particular fiscal decentralization system. Both essays have the Peruvian 
local governments as their unit of analysis.  
The first essay investigates how accountability takes place in local governments in a 
decentralized context. Accountability can refer to different concepts. In this essay we focus 
on the effects of fiscal and policy variables on electoral outcomes. Theoretically, one of the 
benefits of decentralization is the higher accountability that arises when subnational 
governments are responsible for providing goods and services in their jurisdictions and 
when they finance those goods and services with their own revenues. It is expected that this 
framework will increase the interest of citizens in the performance of their elected 
authorities, as well as the concern of elected authorities in their performance motivated by 
their expectations of being reelected or being revoked.  
The second essay examines the nature of fiscal disparities among local governments 
under a decentralized context and the role played by equalization transfers. One of the 
challenges in a decentralized context is to determine a transfer system with equity criteria; 
meaning giving support to those jurisdictions that have low fiscal capacity and higher 
expenditure needs, but without discouraging them to generate their own revenues or incur 
into excessive spending. An important task to deal with this challenge is finding the right 
measures of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, and setting guidelines for how to include 
them in the transfer system formula. The effect of including fiscal capacity and expenditure 
needs measures in the design of equalization transfers could provide a strategy to reduce 
existing fiscal disparities. We propose an alternative allocation methodology that includes a 
measure of fiscal capacity in the current Peruvian equalization transfer and compare it with 
the current formula by identifying the changes in the disparities before and after the 
proposed reform. 
 
  
  
 
 
ESSAYS ON ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EQUALIZATION TRANSFER 
UNDER A DECENTRALIZED CONTEXT: THE CASE OF PERUVIAN 
MUNICIPALITIES 
BY 
LINDA JANET PORRAS-MENDOZA 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
of 
Georgia State University  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY  
2018  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Linda Janet Porras Mendoza 
2018 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
ACCEPTANCE  
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of Linda Janet Porras-Mendoza’s 
Dissertation Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that 
committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of 
Georgia State University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation Chair:  
 
Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Committee: Dr. Charles R. Hankla 
 Dr. Andrey Timofeev  
 Dr. Sally Wallace  
 Dr. Katherine G. Willoughby 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
Sally Wallace, Dean  
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies  
Georgia State University  
May, 2018 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to extend my gratitude first and foremost to my thesis advisor for 
mentoring me. He has helped over the course of the analysis and the writing of the 
dissertation and for that I sincerely thank him for his confidence in me. I would additionally 
like to thank the members of my Committee for their incredible support in both the research 
and especially the revision process that has led to this document. 
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my loved ones without whose support 
and encouragement I could have never completed this doctoral degree.  
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ viii 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... ix 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1 Electoral accountability under a decentralized context ...................................................... 4 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2 Review of the literature and the basic theoretical framework ..................................... 5 
1.2.1 Electoral Accountability ...................................................................................... 5 
1.2.2 Fiscal Decentralization......................................................................................... 7 
1.2.3 Government Performance .................................................................................. 11 
1.3 Peruvian local governments ...................................................................................... 12 
1.3.1 Administrative and political organization .......................................................... 13 
1.3.2 Public expenditure structure .............................................................................. 15 
1.3.3 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) ......................................................................... 16 
1.3.4 Education ........................................................................................................... 17 
1.3.5 Revenue structure............................................................................................... 18 
1.3.6 Intergovernmental transfers ............................................................................... 19 
1.4 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................ 20 
1.5 Data and empirical methodology .............................................................................. 22 
1.5.1 Probability of being recall .................................................................................. 24 
1.5.2 Probability of being reelected ............................................................................ 25 
1.6 Results ....................................................................................................................... 26 
1.6.1 Probability of being recalled .............................................................................. 26 
1.6.2 Probability of being reelected ............................................................................ 27 
1.7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 27 
2 Improving interjurisdictional equalization ....................................................................... 53 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 53 
2.2 Role of intergovernmental transfers .......................................................................... 54 
2.3 Fiscal capacity of Peruvian municipalities ................................................................ 56 
2.3.1 Expenditure structure ......................................................................................... 57 
2.3.2 Revenue structure............................................................................................... 58 
vii 
 
2.3.3 Revenue disparities among municipalities......................................................... 59 
2.3.4 Intergovernmental transfers ............................................................................... 60 
2.4 Municipal Compensation Fund (FCM) ..................................................................... 60 
2.4.1 Challenges associated with FCM ....................................................................... 61 
2.4.2 Current allocation methodology of FCM ........................................................... 62 
2.5 Alternative methodology: incorporating fiscal capacity ........................................... 66 
2.6 Results ....................................................................................................................... 68 
2.6.1 Disparities in per capita revenue of local governments ..................................... 69 
2.6.2 Effect of the alternative methodology................................................................ 69 
2.7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 70 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 86 
VITA ........................................................................................................................................ 90 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Number of districts per province ............................................................................ 31 
Figure 1.2 Situation of territorial demarcation ........................................................................ 32 
Figure 1.3 Case of a Mayor that was revoked, but was reelected in the next election ............ 35 
Figure 1.4 Generation of Municipal Solid Waste, 2008-2013 (thousands of tons per year) ... 39 
Figure 1.5 Property tax to GDP ratio, Peru and selected comparators .................................... 41 
Figure 2.1 Current and alternative methodology to distribute the FCM .................................. 80 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Types of performance measures .............................................................................. 29 
Table 1.2 Number and population of district municipalities, 2007-2015 ................................ 30 
Table 1.3 Number of lists that competed in local elections ..................................................... 33 
Table 1.4 Recall processes in Peru from 1997 to 2013............................................................ 34 
Table 1.5 Local government expenditures as a % of GDP, 2004-2014 ................................... 36 
Table 1.6 Per capita spending by type of municipality, 2009-2014 (in new sols of 2014) ..... 37 
Table 1.7 Allocation of responsibilities by level of government ............................................. 38 
Table 1.8 Main characteristics of municipal tax revenue assignments .................................... 40 
Table 1.9 Revenue composition of local governments, 2004-2014 (as % of GDP) ................ 42 
Table 1.10 Distribution procedure for the revenues from Canon ............................................ 43 
Table 1.11 Revenue structure of local governments, 2004-2014 (%) ..................................... 44 
Table 1.12 Expected impact in the probability of being revoked and reelected ...................... 45 
Table 1.13 Variable definitions and sources ............................................................................ 46 
Table 1.14 Summary statistics ................................................................................................. 47 
Table 1.15 Effect of fiscal and policy variables in probability of Mayors to be revoked 
(OLOGIT-odds-ratio) ...................................................................................................... 48 
Table 1.16 Tests of the parallel regression assumption ........................................................... 49 
Table 1.17 Effect of fiscal and policy variables on probability of Mayors to be reelected –
(PROBIT and HECKMAN estimates) ............................................................................. 50 
Table 1.18 Effect of fiscal and policy variables in probability of Mayors to be reelected 
(OPROBIT and MPROBIT estimates) ............................................................................ 51 
Table 1.19 Testing the proportionality of odds assumption using the Likelihood Ratio test .. 52 
Table 2.1 Allocation of responsibilities by level of government ............................................. 72 
Table 2.2 Main characteristics of municipal tax revenue assignments .................................... 73 
Table 2.3 Revenue composition of local governments, 2004-2014 (as % of GDP) ................ 74 
Table 2.4 Revenue structure of local governments, 2004-2014 (%) ....................................... 75 
Table 2.5 Own revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014) .................. 76 
Table 2.6 Tax revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014) ................... 77 
Table 2.7 Non-tax revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014) ............. 78 
Table 2.8 Characteristics of local governments own revenues, 2014 ...................................... 79 
Table 2.9 Distribution procedure for the revenues from Canon .............................................. 81 
Table 2.10 Equalization goals, allocation factors and international practice .......................... 82 
Table 2.11 Estimation of per capita total revenues per district ................................................ 83 
Table 2.12 Disparities in local governments revenue (per capita) within and between 
provinces, 2014 ................................................................................................................ 84 
Table 2.13 Changes in disparities in local governments revenue (per capita) within and 
between provinces using the alternative allocations of FCM, 2014 ................................ 85 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The expression “One size fits all?” has frequently been used to question the risks of 
generalizing policies across countries. It is the constant reminder that policies need to adjust 
to the political and social context of the unit of analysis. Our interest in this dissertation is 
on fiscal decentralization, which is one of those cases where adjustment to the political and 
social context is of special importance.  
The main goal pursued with fiscal decentralization is to improve efficiency in the 
provision of public goods by transferring power to lower levels of government and to 
citizens. The outcome of improved efficiency depends critically on local government 
officials being more accountable to citizens in the provision of local services than central 
authorities. That is, the expectation that citizens will care and react to government’s actions 
and that in turn, governments will strive harder to satisfy the needs and preferences of 
citizens.  
And yet local government accountability is a subject that has been extensively studied, 
but with largely inconclusive results. In large measure the problem lies in that the concept of 
accountability itself is viewed differently comprising different kinds of institutions and 
strategies. Most importantly, there is still a lack of a general framework that can be used to 
test or predict the impact or influence of accountability on important processes and policies, 
including fiscal decentralization. 
Another potential reason for the diversity of results in the case of the role played by 
accountability on fiscal decentralization outcomes comes from the methodological 
limitations of studies using across countries panel data. These studies allow us to test 
general aspects of the structure of the general government. But they are limited in what 
economic variables can be used to measure outcomes because the necessary information 
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does not exist at a sufficient disaggregated level. Also, cross country studies are limited in 
how much they can say about the dynamic changes that take place in a country when a 
policy such as decentralization is implemented. Specific single country studies can offer a 
rich alternative to disentangle the interaction between accountability and decentralization 
outcomes. 
A second important goal pursued with fiscal decentralization is to increase equality for 
access to public service delivery among residents of different subnational units. Here the 
main difficulty typically lies in the measurement of the expenditure needs and revenue 
capacity of the subnational governments. Here again “one size may not fit all” because 
countries differ very significantly in geographic conditions, developments levels or 
abundance and distribution of natural resources across subnational units. And even though 
much useful work has been done on the issues of how best equalize across subnational units 
using cross country data, it is again the case that more can be learned by using disaggregated 
data for specific country case studies, especially if those countries are characterized by 
significant diversity among subnational governments.  
In this dissertation we study the two issues of: (i) how decentralization, reflected in the 
share of expenses financed with local revenues and policy outcomes, affects electoral 
outcomes and (ii) how best design interjurisdictional equalization mechanisms in the 
presence of considerable subnational diversity, by using data from Peru. The reasons why is 
interesting to study a country like Peru are twofold: First, decentralization and electoral 
accountability mechanisms have been well established at all subnational levels (regional and 
local). Second, Peru shows a great diversity of conditions across local jurisdictions. This 
diversity comes from its complex geography, the extremely uneven distribution of 
significant endowments of natural resources, and from an administrative structure that is 
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characterized by a great level fragmentation. In this study we focus on local governments –
as opposed to regional governments -- since they have received more responsibilities and 
revenue resources, and the one level that has more significantly used the existing 
accountability mechanisms. 
Both papers seek to contribute to the practice of decentralization. We hope that the 
study of these two main sets of issues -the role of decentralization in accountability and how 
to equalize resources in the presence of great subnational diversity- will shed light on these 
issues and provide insight that will be useful to academic researchers and policymakers.  
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1 Electoral accountability under a decentralized context 
1.1 Introduction 
The discussion about fiscal decentralization and accountability has been vast: from their 
definitions, the factors that influence their success, among others. However, despite the 
amount of research, there are still issues concerning both decentralization and accountability 
that require further clarification. In the case of fiscal decentralization, there has been a lot of 
discussion about the criteria to assigned expenditure responsibilities among levels of 
governments, but there is still a lack of a general theory of revenue assignments, which in turn 
affects the types of accountability mechanisms available. In the case of accountability, several 
mechanisms have been promoted with the expectation that they will enhance public policy and 
administration decisions by allowing citizens to take an active role in shaping actual policies. 
But it remains unclear how the effectiveness of these mechanisms can be measured. 
More important to us in this essay, there are still questions about how the two constructs 
of fiscal decentralization and accountability relate to each other. Considering the complexity of 
fiscal decentralization and accountability, it is important to set the scope of our analysis. In the 
case of decentralization, the essay focuses on the role played by intergovernmental transfers by 
testing the impact of fiscal and policy variables on electoral outcomes. In the case of 
accountability, we focus on two types of accountability mechanism that takes place through 
the electoral system. Understanding the dynamic between fiscal and policy variables with 
electoral outcomes have mostly been the focus on the central level of government, our essay 
contributes to the literature by investigating these processes among local governments.  
The structure of this essay is as follows. Section 1.2 presents the literature review and the 
testable hypotheses used in our empirical analysis. Section 1.3 describes the main 
characteristics of Peruvian local governments. Section 1.4 describes the data and the empirical 
methodology. Section 1.6 presents the results. Section 1.7 concludes. 
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1.2 Review of the literature and the basic theoretical framework 
1.2.1 Electoral Accountability 
Accountability institutions aim to improve the efficiency of public spending by 
encouraging public officials to design and deliver public services according to the demands 
and needs of their citizens, and by giving citizens a role in the decision-making process.1 Its 
importance, as described by Bovens (2005), relies on the role it plays in enhancing the 
legitimacy of public governance by allowing democratic control and improving government 
performance. The focus of our essay is the accountability that takes place through the electoral 
system (electoral accountability).2  
The literature uses different approaches to define the presence of electoral accountability. 
Some scholars consider the reelection (or no reelection) of elected public officials, based on 
their performance, as evidence of accountability.3 Others consider that any form of reward or 
punishment regarding electoral outcomes is a sufficient indicator of accountability.4 We 
consider the former approach to define electoral accountability. 
Elections are not the only mechanism of direct democracy that allows voters to express 
approval or disapproval of government performance.5 Direct recalls allow a specified number 
of citizens to demand a vote for the electorate on whether elected officials should be removed 
from office before the end of their term. There are similarities between elections and recalls; 
                                                 
1 The term accountability can refer to different concepts: the type of compliance; the mechanism set to enforce 
compliance; the expected outcomes and citizens reaction to government performance (Rubin, 1996).  
2 In this essay, we use the term “Electoral Accountability” and “Accountability'’ indistinctly and we take the 
outcome of reelection and revoked as measures of accountability. 
3 Seabright (1996) defines accountability as the probability that a region will be able to choose to elect or reject a 
government purely according to its own view of the government's performance. 
4 Samuels (2010) considered different measures of electoral accountability: change in vote share for the incumbent 
party; change in seat share of the incumbent party; change in government status, if the incumbent party retains 
control of the executive; and, change in partisan control of the national executive. Gélineau (2013) used, as a 
measure of economic vote, the individual evaluations of the incumbent and vote intention for the incumbent party. 
Previously they used the percentage vote received in the subnational election by the President's party (Gélineau & 
Remmer, 2006). Other studies used citizens' perceptions of government (Escobar‐Lemmon & Ross, 2014). 
5 Direct democracy is the decision making process in which the vote of citizens has a direct influence on the 
contents of laws. It includes a broad range of different institutional mechanisms, such as referendum, plebiscites, 
recalls, or popular initiatives (Altman, 2002; Feld & Savioz, 1997). 
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they are both regularized means for citizens to reward or sanction elected public officials 
(Timmons & Garfias, 2015). However, recalls allow to remove elected representatives before 
the end of their regular term and voters are in charge of collecting the signatures to initiate the 
recall process. Its activation is expected to be more frequent in contexts of political distrust in 
the government’s performance (Bowler, 2004). 
Some of the theoretical frameworks used to study electoral accountability are the 
principal-agent problem and the economic voting theory. According to the principal-agent 
problem, the principal (voters) delegates to the agent (elected officials) a set of instruments to 
execute certain goals. The problem arises because the interests of the principal and the agent 
may be different, which can create inefficiencies and corruption (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 
2003).6 In the context of economic voting theory, voters punish or reward incumbent parties 
and public officials for their relative success in managing the economy through their vote 
(Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2011). Elections should make public officials accountable to the 
public and the threat of losing office in the next period compels public officials to deliver good 
services and refrain from extracting rents (Barro, 1973).7  
However, comparative politics scholars have repeatedly found substantial variation in 
economic voting across countries, over time, and even within countries over time. There are 
empirical findings that show how voters make choices including factors beyond the 
governments’ performance (Carlin & Singh, 2015). Voters could fail to impose sanctions 
because they do not have the resources or skills to evaluate the performance of public officials 
or to properly assign the responsibility (Anderson, 2007; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). There 
                                                 
6 Elected officials may be interested in pursuing their own agenda like enriching themselves while in office; or, 
even if they are honest, providing goods and services that differ from what the public wants. 
7 The process of the individual vote choice is determined by the retrospective and prospective evaluation of 
candidates; and, the voter's party identification (Stein, 1990). In the retrospective evaluation, citizens examine 
whether the state of the world has improved under the elected public official's watch, and vote accordingly. In the 
prospective evaluation, voters’ beliefs about the future performance of the economy influence their vote. 
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is also the case that what is perceived as voters’ active role it actually reflects political 
instability or power of the local elites (Bardhan, 2002).  
There are also concerns about the effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms. Even 
though elections and recalls are important control mechanisms, they may not be sufficient to 
cause improved accountability (Ackerman, 2004).8  Other factors that can influence 
accountability are the characteristics of the electoral system, political regime and political 
parties (Eaton & Schroeder, 2010).9 In the particular case of the recall, some considered it 
ineffective and that one of the outcomes of recall elections has often been the paradoxical one 
that the incumbent has been strengthened (Qvortrup, 2011). In this essay we test if government 
performance and the funding sources have a role in the probability of Mayors of being revoked 
or reelected after controlling for other factors that could affect voters’ choices. The next 
section explains the argument of why funding sources could affect electoral outcomes. 
1.2.2 Fiscal Decentralization 
The term decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and responsibilities from the 
central to subnational governments.10 Decentralization as a policy includes political, 
administrative and fiscal aspects.11 The literature of decentralization has evolved from the 
discussion of the allocation of competencies across levels of governments (first-generation 
theory) to an analysis that incorporates the role of institutions and public officials’ incentives 
(second-generation theory). Under the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism, the 
devolution of tax and expenditure authority to lower levels of government yields greater public 
sector efficiency and elected public officials are considered benevolent maximizers of the 
                                                 
8 Elections and recalls only hold accountable elected officials, leaving out appointed bureaucrats. 
9 Local elections are more likely to succeed in creating accountable governments if they are competitive and voters 
judge candidates on their ability to provide services. If elections were not competitive, this would be an argument 
against decentralization (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). 
10 Based on its legal status, the decentralization can refer to the deconcentration; delegation; or, devolution of local 
autonomy (Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989). 
11 The political aspect aims to promote political representation and stability; the administrative aspect aims to 
improve the technical efficiency; and, the fiscal aspect aims to improve the delivery of public services. 
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social welfare.12 The second generation theory of fiscal federalism builds on the first 
generation theory, but it also incorporates a public choice and political economy perspective, 
and the problems of information (Oates, 2005). It focuses on the incentive effects of different 
intergovernmental arrangements (Barry R Weingast, 1995).13 
Many countries have sought decentralization as a mean to achieve a more efﬁcient public 
sector (Martinez‐Vazquez et al., 2017). There is also the argument that decentralization might 
reduce corruption because there is greater interjurisdictional competition (Arikan, 2004). 
However, even if interjurisdictional competition motivates public officials to behave honestly, 
it does not necessarily mean they have the capacity to do so (Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2009).  
On the issue of how the decentralized responsibilities should be financed, the first 
generation literature theorized that revenue generation at the subnational level should follow 
the benefit principle.14 The benefits of providing revenue autonomy are that subnational 
governments can address their vertical imbalances.15 Without revenue autonomy there cannot 
be discretion as regards to the level of expenditure; and, revenue autonomy is a key indicator 
of subnational governments’ borrowing capacity and creditworthiness (Bahl & Martinez-
Vazquez, 2013). 
The second generation literature emphasizes the importance of revenue autonomy due to 
its link to accountability. It addresses the influence of the funding sources in the behavior of 
public officials and citizens. According to Bahl (1992), the fiscal system of subnational 
governments can achieve accountability, specifically by financing services with their own 
revenues. By using their own revenues to finance services, public officials are more concerned 
about spending efficiency as they tend to be more accountable by citizens.  
                                                 
12 Some of the main contributors of the first-generation are Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972). 
13 For a comparative review of the first and second generation theory of fiscal federalism, see (Martinez‐Vazquez, 
Lago‐Peñas, & Sacchi, 2017; Oates, 2005; Barry R. Weingast, 2009). 
14 Meaning that those who benefit from the service should pay accordingly for those benefits (Bird, 2011). 
15 This happens when the expenditure needs of subnational governments exceed their ability to finance them. 
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Both first and second generation literature argue that the incentives of public officials to 
perform well are relevant if they have a significant revenue autonomy (Bird, 2009). Own 
revenues are not only "easier" to use but they can also allow getting more resources in the 
credit market. Also, citizens can assess the performance concerning the amount and qualities 
of services they are getting for the taxes they pay (Yilmaz, 2009).16  
On the other hand, transfers cause concern because they generate income that can be 
relative substantial, is paid by external actors, and accrues directly to government without 
requiring bureaucratic capacity or interaction with citizens. The risk of being financed mostly 
with transfers is that elected public officials are less accountable for their fiscal decisions 
because they can increase spending without increasing taxes relieving social pressure for 
greater accountability (Paler, 2013; Ross, 2001). Also, it could cause a delay in the operations 
of local governments since most transfers are assigned to a particular purpose and/or required 
an approval process.17 However, there is also empirical evidence that citizens do care about 
their share of transfers (Ross, 2012). 
Besides the influence that the nature of the funding sources may have on the behavior of 
elected public officials, the literature also consider the incentives associated with the electoral 
cycle. The theory of political business cycles (PBC) originated with Nordhaus (1975) proposed 
a model in which incumbent politicians would manipulate the economy to gain electoral 
advantage. The model assumes myopic voters cannot perceive the systematic relationship 
between policy decisions and the timing of elections while non-myopic voters are likely to 
punish rather than reward the political manipulation of policies directed at securing electoral 
advantage (Rosenberg, 1992). The study of Peltzman suggests that American voters are 
                                                 
16 Asatryan, Feld and Geys (2012) found evidence using a sample of OECD countries that greater revenue 
decentralization is associated with improved sub-national government budget deficits/surpluses. 
17 There are other factors that may also influence public officials and citizens’ behavior. For example, the clarity of 
the assignment of responsibilities influences citizens’ capability to assess their local authorities’ performance. 
According to Lago-Peñas (2010), it is easier for citizens to correctly assign responsibility for government action 
when the political competencies are in the hands of the national government. 
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especially averse to higher spending, penalizing candidates irrespective of the political office 
up for grabs (Peltzman, 1992). The rationality is that in more developed democracies, voters 
are able to identify the strategy of the incumbent. However, most studies show that voters 
reward increased public expenditure at national, regional and local levels (Akhmedov & 
Zhuravskaya, 2004; Litschig & Morrison, 2012).   
There are other researchers that conceive the PBC mechanism through changes in the 
expenditure composition rather than its level in order to affect electoral outcomes (Rogoff, 
1990). Mayors are more likely to manipulate the expenditure components that are visible to the 
electorate in a manner that could signal greater competence (Veiga & Veiga, 2007). The 
obvious question would be what those components are. Following the economic classification 
used for expenditure budgets, we distinguished between current and capital expenditure.18 
Some researchers consider current expenditure more rigid than capital expenditure, 19 therefore 
the opportunistic behavior focuses on investment expenditures that are highly visible to the 
electorate, such as infrastructure. However, other researchers argue that capital expenditure is 
more rigid because most of them are long term and is difficult to coordinate with elections. 
Having incomplete projects at election time could create political risks for incumbents, who 
may be seen as unable to deliver promised benefits (Block, 2002). 
In this paper, we aim to analyze different elements of the expenditure structure that may 
have different effects on electoral outcomes: the funding and the components. Considering the 
complexity of the rationality of elected public officials and voters, we do not assume these 
sides are mutually exclusive.  
                                                 
18 Current expenditure includes the disbursements destined to the operations of production of goods and services. 
Capital expenditure includes the acquisition or production of tangible assets which serve for the production of 
goods and services (MEF, 2011).  
19 For example, items like salaries do not have enough flexibility since they are regulated by contracts. 
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1.2.3 Government Performance 
Most of the discussion of the importance of government performance has been developed 
in the two previous sections.20 Government performance plays a significant role in the 
literature of decentralization and electoral accountability. Improving efficiency and equity are 
part of the goal of transferring responsibilities and resources to subnational governments and 
voters use (a measure of) government performance to evaluate their elected public officials. 
The citizens’ evaluation of elected public officials is considered retrospective 
evaluation.21 Citizens examine whether the state of the world has improved under the elected 
public official's watch, and vote accordingly. If electors vote retrospectively, elections should 
make policy makers accountable to the public; and, the threat of losing office in the next 
period, compels elected public officials to deliver good services and refrain from extracting 
rents (Barro, 1973). 
Government performance refers to different concepts. In the context of fiscal 
decentralization, fiscal performance refers to the fiscal discipline in the use of the money 
(Rodden, 2002; Yilmaz, 1999). There is evidence that voters can reward prudent financial 
policy (Brender, 2003).22 However, the literature of government performance has extended 
from being initially associated with cost-efficiency improvements to having an emphasis on 
effectiveness. Some authors (Ammons, 1997; Carnevale & Carnevale, 1993; DuPont-Morales 
& Harris, 1994) highlight the importance of expanding the concept of performance from 
traditional measures of monetary resources to include information about an organization’s 
purpose, direction, and impact. Table 1.1 shows different types of performance measures. 
                                                 
20 The definition of government performance differs between presidential and subnational elections. While voters 
focus on the perception of the national economy at the moment of Presidential elections, it is more likely they will 
pay more attention to the activities happening in their jurisdictions in local elections. 
21 However, this analysis has mostly focus in national and state elections. According to a study done by Berry and 
Howell (2007), less than 1% of the 212 articles on elections published between 1980 and 2000 in ﬁve top political 
science journals examined local elections, none of which concerned retrospective voting. 
22 The effect is assumed to be driven by the better information availability; voter tendency to focus on local issues; 
and, imposing a hard budget constraint by the government.  
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Besides the complexity of the concept, there are other challenges associated with 
developing a performance measurement system that can be useful for different interest groups 
and contribute to different goals (like improving performance and accountability) (Bromberg, 
2009). Measuring government performance has the potential to improve the communication 
between budget office in the states and legislators, improve service quality and increase 
awareness about the results (Willoughby, 2004). However, some incumbents have incentives 
to hide taxes, overemphasize the benefits of spending, and hide government liabilities (Benito 
& Bastida, 2009). 
The discussion of the role of government performance measures in the decision making 
process of public officials goes beyond the scope of this paper. Our paper focuses on testing 
the role on citizens, specifically voters. 
1.3 Peruvian local governments 
Peru is a constitutional democratic country located in South America with a population of 
31 million as of 2015. The main economic activities are agriculture, fisheries, mining, 
exploitation of oil and gas, and manufacturing of goods. The mining industry is the sector with 
the greatest growth and contribution to the GDP, exports, and tax input.23 
The country has experienced a reduction in poverty over the past decade. The incidence 
of poverty has fallen from 59% (2004) to 22% (2015) and extreme poverty has fallen from 
over 16% (2004) to less than 5% (2015). However, national averages usually hide the 
disparities between age groups and regions.24  
                                                 
23 By the early 2010s, the value of Peru’s mining exports averaged nearly 25 billion US dollars, or 14% of GDP and 
over 50% of total exports. Source: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/statistics/annual-tables.html. The GDP per capita has 
expanded from USD 3,311 in 2000 to USD 6,089 in 2016 (values express in constant 2010 US$). Source: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=PE.  
24 For instance, the incidence of poverty among children under 14 years old is around 30%, but in rural areas the 
incidence is about the 50% (INEI, 2013, 2016). In 9 of the 26 regions, the incidence of poverty is over 34%. The 
regions with the highest incidence of poverty are characterized by a higher physical vulnerability in terms of 
occurrence of earthquakes, volcanism, droughts and frosts (MINAM, 2016a). 
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The country has been undergoing a decentralization process since 2002.25 The process has 
been gradual and fiscally conservative trying to preserve fiscal discipline at the subnational 
level. Although a lot of regulation was issued and implemented regarding fiscal assignments, 
most of it took place on the expenditure side, with very weak attempts to enhance the revenue 
autonomy of subnational governments.  
1.3.1 Administrative and political organization 
The territory is composed of departments (or regions), provinces and districts, which are 
the base for the political demarcation.26 There are three major tiers of government: A national 
government, regional governments and local governments (or municipalities); this last tier is 
divided into provincial and district municipalities. Regional and local governments approve 
their own budgets and local governments do not depend hierarchically on the regional 
governments. The same way, district municipalities do not depend hierarchically on the 
provincial municipalities.27  
Local governments consist of a Municipal Council as the policy-making, regulatory and 
oversight body, the Mayor as the executive organ, and a Local Coordination Council (CCL) in 
charge of promoting public participation mechanisms. The Mayors and councilpersons elected 
assume office the first day of January following the election year.28 Citizens have the right to 
elect their subnational authorities and the right to request their vacancy or recall from office.29 
                                                 
25 The first attempt of decentralization started at the end of the 1980s. The process reflected the incentives of the 
ruling party at the time to build up a subnational power base (Kim, 1992). After following a gradual approach, in 
2006, the central government accelerated the transfer of responsibilities (CGP, 2014). 
26 The country can also be divided into 3 geographical areas: the coast -where the capital city of Lima is located- 
(that represents 10.5% of the territory); the highlands or Sierra -which contains the country’s major mineral 
deposits- (32% of the territory); and the tropical forest -which is the less populated- (57.5% of the territory). 
27 The population and number of district municipalities is shown in Table 1.2. 
28 Regional governments consist of a Council as the regulatory and oversight body, the Governor as the executive 
organ, and a Coordination Council as a consultative body to coordinate with municipalities. 
29 The recall process (CPR) is a mechanism that allows citizens to demand a vote for the electorate on whether an 
elected public official should be removed from office before the end of his/her term. 
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The vote is universal and compulsory until the age of 70 under the imposition of a fine. Local 
authorities are elected for four years and, until 2018, could run for immediate reelection.30  
The electoral rules and the local political environment influence the local elections; voters 
can only cast a single ballot for both Mayor and Local Council, so even if the winning list 
receives less than 50%, the Mayor's party is assured a majority on the Local Council. 31 Also, 
small political organizations do not face a serious threat of de‐registration if they do not reach 
a minimum number of votes (Crabtree, 2010; Morgenstern & Green, 2009). The previous 
situation has caused an increase in the number of lists that compete in local elections (see  
Table 1.3 which results in a higher vote dispersion and reduces the percentage of votes 
obtained by the winner.32  
The role played by traditional national political parties has also influenced local elections. 
In 1980, national parties had almost full control of local governments. After the 2002 
decentralization process, subnational political organizations, particularly regional movements, 
became the main force in local politics. In 2014, regional movements had control of more than 
50% of local governments (Aragon, Makarin, & Pique, 2015). 
The design of the mechanism and the degree of institutionalization of political parties also 
explain the significant use of recall referendums (CPRs) (Welp, 2016).  To start a recall 
referendum, the National Election Board ask to collect some signatures, but it does not require 
a legal process to demonstrate acts of corruption or bad management.33 Since its first 
                                                 
30 Mayors are elected by the highest number of votes. An election held in any district or province is declared invalid 
if the null or blank votes exceed two thirds of the number of valid votes. 
31 The country is characterized by a high level of municipal fragmentation and most of the provinces and districts 
have not formalized or updated their political and administrative boundaries or mapping according to the Territorial 
Demarcation and Organization Law (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). According to the National Census of 2007, 
49% of the districts should be merged for not meeting the minimum number of inhabitants. This is explained in part 
by the absence of public services in remote locations. 
32 Between 1998 and 2006 only a small percentage of local authorities were elected by majority. In 2002, 1.5% of 
the local authorities elected got more than 50% of the votes. In 2006, 57% of the local authorities elected got 
between 22% and 33% of the votes (ONPE, 2010). 
33 The most recurrent grounds to request a CPR are: i) non-fulfillment of electoral promises, ii) the authority does 
not call for open councils, iii) irregularities in the procurement process, iv) does not develop infrastructure, and v) 
does not perform all his/her functions (ONPE, 2013a). 
15 
 
application in 1997, there have been 10 rounds of recalls where more than 5,000 subnational 
authorities have been evaluated and more than 1,700 were revoked (see Table 1.4).34 Also, we 
found four cases where the Mayor was revoked, but still had the chance to run for reelection 
and won. We show one of those cases in Figure 1.3. 
1.3.2 Public expenditure structure 
The central government has issued several laws to set the expenditure responsibilities of 
subnational governments which assigned shared and exclusive competences. Among local 
governments, provincial and district municipalities have the same expenditure responsibilities, 
the former also have other service responsibilities that extend to the district municipalities 
within the provincial boundaries. 
Subnational spending has increased in the last years. The share of total spending executed 
by subnational governments rose from 30% in 2004 to 40% in 2014. Regarding GDP, the local 
government spending rose from 2.5% in 2004 to 4.3% in 2014 (see Table 1.5). However, there 
are also great inequalities, the richest district municipality has a per capita spending 250 times 
the spending of the poorest one (see Table 1.6). 
One of the challenges in the transfer of expenditures responsibilities is the wording of the 
regulation. Many functions overlap between the central government and the subnational level 
and provide numerous functions with little clarity in their definition (see Table 1.7). Several 
studies (Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, & Sepulveda, 2012; Martinez-Vazquez, 
2013; OECD, 2016) highlight the need to clarify the shared and exclusive responsibilities 
among levels of government and to establish a mechanism for the coordination and resolution 
of conflicts among them. 
                                                 
34 Based on this situation, in 2015, the Congress adjusted the laws that regulate elections and recall process. The 
new regulation prohibited the immediate reelection of subnational authorities and required them to resign six 
months before the election if they want to run for a different position. Also, there is only one recall process during 
the third year of the administration period and the replacements of the revoked authorities will remain in office 
until the end of the administration period. 
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The spending patterns have also been affected by the increased in the revenue sharing 
transfers. As the proceeds from extractive industries are by law earmarked to finance 
investment projects and associated infrastructure maintenance spending, a bias towards capital 
spending was created in the structure of subnational expenditures. As a result, the allocation of 
public infrastructure projects in the general budget increased on average from 30% in 2004 to 
65% in 2014 for local governments. The requirements about the use of funds on capital 
expenditures are likely to have a negative impact on the efficiency and quality of public 
services (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). 
To test the relationship between government performance and electoral outcomes, we 
take two services provided by local governments in different levels:  Municipal Solid Waste 
(MSW) management and Education. The provision of the first service relies mostly on local 
governments, which makes easier for citizens to identify responsibility. The second one is a 
shared responsibility between the central, regional and local government.  
1.3.3 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) 
The regulation makes the provincial municipalities responsible for managing solid waste 
of domestic and commercial origin. Also, in coordination with the health sector at the national 
level, they evaluate and identify the appropriate spaces to implement supervised sanitary 
landfills.35 The district municipalities are responsible for the collection and transportation of 
these solid wastes, as well as for the cleaning of streets and public spaces. The district 
municipalities also have the task of ensuring that fees are charged for the provision of the 
service based on the criteria established by the provincial municipality (MINAM, 2016b). 
Besides the fees, the service is also financed by taxes and transfers.  
During 2013, Peru generated more than 7 million tons of municipal solid waste (MSW), 
64% corresponds to household solid waste and 36% to non-household solid waste (see Figure 
                                                 
35 Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA). Report 2013-2014 (in Spanish). 
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1.4).36 One of the challenges in the provision of the service is the shortage of suitable places 
for final disposal. It is estimated that the country requires 190 infrastructures for the final 
disposal of solid waste. However, in 2014 there were only eleven supervised sanitary landfills 
with all the requirements and corresponding authorizations, and ten facilities for the disposal 
of waste from the non-municipal level at the national level (MINAM, 2013). The main source 
of funding is the municipal equalization transfer and the fees have a secondary role. However, 
many municipalities do not bother to charge fees despite of providing the service 
(OECD/ECLAC, 2017). 
1.3.4 Education 
The main challenge in the Peruvian education system is the quality of the service. Peru 
ranks last among the 65 countries that participated in the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) in 2012.37 In 2009, the country occupied the penultimate place in science 
and the antepenultimate in math and reading comprehension (PISA, 2010).38 The three levels 
of government share the responsibility of provision of education. At the central level, the 
Ministry of Education has technical-policy and political functions. It defines, manages and 
coordinates the education policy in coordination with regional governments. The local 
governments guard the operation of primary education.39 Local governments are not directly 
responsible for the provision of educational services, their role is to support and promote 
education. Possibly the main task of local governments is the infrastructure and equipment of 
schools (World Bank, 2010a). 
                                                 
36 Peru has a population of more than 30 million and more than 23 million lived in cities (urban population), 
representing 76% of total population. The national average of MSW is more than 18 thousand tons per day from 
which only 48% is disposed in a supervised sanitary landfill; the remnant is being inadequately disposed in the 
environment (MINAM, 2014). 
37 PISA is an international survey which aims to evaluate education systems. The exam is prepared by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/ 
38 Students in rural areas are a critical group because they often speak an indigenous language and study in classrooms 
that combine a wide variety of ages and grades under a single teacher (Cueto, 2004).  
39 Primary education comprises six degrees organized in three cycles of two years each.  
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The design of the decentralization of education has been inefficient. The subnational 
government expenditure powers are not well defined in the legal framework. Thus, there are 
overlaps or contradictions in the responsibilities among levels of government (Consejo 
Nacional de Educación, 2010). The budget structure for education limits the autonomy of 
decentralized bodies and their ability to improve the quality of services. The budget allocation 
is based on historical records, which limits the possibilities of subnational governments to 
generate significant changes. Also, the funding mechanisms have proved more complex than 
expected, which has led to delays in the transfer of resources and raise transaction costs for the 
provision of services (World Bank, 2010a). 
1.3.5 Revenue structure 
Peruvian municipalities generate revenues from taxes and user charges (for services like 
street cleaning, road tolls, parks maintenance, public safety services, and construction 
permits).40 District municipalities collect the property tax and the tax on transfers of real 
estate, and provincial municipalities collect the tax on motor vehicles and taxes on public 
entertainment, lotteries and gambling. However, the current fiscal decentralization framework 
provides low revenue autonomy to subnational governments.41 The central government sets 
the tax rates and regulations on the tax bases. The main characteristics of the tax revenue 
assignment can be seen in Table 1.8. 
The local taxation exhibits a low efficiency due to generous exemptions, weak tax 
administration, lack of a complete or updated cadaster of properties (Alfaro & Rühling, 2007).  
Although there has been a recent improvement in tax collection (see Table 1.9), the 
                                                 
40 Local governments also have access to borrowing, but due to their reduced access to credit markets and the tight 
borrowing restrictions, the level of indebtedness is very low. 
41 Tax assignments for local governments had been defined in 1993 and the decentralization laws did not change 
them substantially. In the case of regional governments, they do not have tax assignments and their own revenues 
consist of user charges, fees and other small revenue sources. 
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performance of the main local tax (property tax) is significantly lower relative to other 
countries in the region (see Figure 1.5).  
Overall, the share of own revenues over the total has experienced a decreasing tendency 
falling from 36% of total revenues in 2004 to 26% in 2014. In the particular case of tax 
revenues, in the majority of local governments, own tax revenues represent less than 5% of 
total revenues.  There is revenue disparity among local governments and a significant 
dependency on intergovernmental transfers. Only in the municipalities of Metropolitan Lima -
the capital city- the tax revenue represents around 40% of their total revenues. As a result, 
local governments’ finances heavily rely on intergovernmental transfers that bridge the gap 
between increasing spending needs associated to the gradual decentralization of functional 
responsibilities and their low capacity to raise own revenues.  
1.3.6 Intergovernmental transfers 
There are two major types of intergovernmental transfers to local governments: Canon 
and FONCOMUN (FCM). The first one comes from the exploitation of natural resources,42 it 
is allocated on an origin basis and earmarked for investment and maintenance spending.43 
FCM is an unconditional equalization transfer that is allocated to all local governments by a 
measure of expenditure needs.44 There is a third earmarked transfer “Ordinary Resources” 
(OR) set to finance operating costs of decentralized functions; however, its allocation criteria 
seems more discretionary compared to the previous ones.45 
                                                 
42 There are different types of Canon: forest canon, gas canon, hydro-energetic canon, mining canon, fishing canon, 
oil canon and sobrecanon, mining royalties. 
43 The central government collects the taxes from the mining companies and then distributes to subnational 
governments. The distribution criteria is shown in Table 1.10. 
44 It was established in 1994 with the objective of promoting investment in local governments. It is financed by the 
Municipal Promotion Tax (IPM) which is a surtax rate of 2% on top of the central government's VAT; a tax on 
vehicles that use gasoline; and, a tax on recreational crafts. 
45 Other transfers, less significant in terms of their magnitude, include the Fund for the Promotion of Regional and 
Local Public Investment which provides matching grants for investment projects directed to reduce infrastructure 
and social service delivery gaps; the Socioeconomic Development Fund of the Camisea Project that finances basic 
social infrastructure investments in areas affected by the Camisea Project; and the conditional cash transfer for the 
modernization of municipalities. 
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The share of Canon in the local governments’ revenue increased from 15% in 2004 to 
39% in 2011 and then fell to 32% in 2014 due to the variation in the commodity prices (see 
Table 1.11). The evolution of the Canon is the most significant factor influencing the 
distribution of fiscal resources among local governments, and their revenue and spending 
patterns. There are around 500 district municipalities for which natural resource-related 
revenues account for 50& or more of their total revenues. The share of Canon made local 
budgets vulnerable to external shocks and added more volatility to their revenue flows. Also, 
there are several requirements for the use of Canon in capital expenditure. While this may be 
an understandable reaction to the overspending that took place at the beginning, it appears 
impractical when hundreds of local governments have more than 50% of revenues stemming 
from the Canon (World Bank, 2010b). 
On the other hand, the relative importance of FCM on local governments’ revenues has 
slightly decreased over time from 30% of total revenues in 2004 to around 25% in 2014 (see 
Table 1.11). Its allocation formula does not include fiscal capacity, 46 which means that 
beneficiaries with high fiscal capacity such as the local governments that receive Canon, also 
receive FCM transfers proportionate to their expenditure needs.47  
1.4 Hypotheses 
We tested the role of government performance and spending in the probability of elected 
public officials of being removed or reelected. We consider two services provided by local 
governments in different magnitudes: Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) collection and 
Education. The provision of the first service relies mostly on local governments, which makes 
easier for citizens to identify who bears the responsibility. For Education, the responsibility is 
                                                 
46 The allocation criteria of the FCM is presented in detailed in subsection 2.4.2. 
47 The first stage in the allocation process considers the expenditure needs at the province level to determine the 
total to be assigned to the province, which affects the districts whose expenditure needs are “higher” than the 
overall province. For example, two identical districts may receive different transfer amounts just because they are 
in provinces with overall different fiscal needs. The formula also guarantees a minimum transfer level to all local 
governments which offset the effect of considering measures of expenditure needs. 
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shared between the central, regional and local government. We consider the link between 
government performance and electoral outcomes as evidence of electoral accountability. In 
other words, a better performance decreases the Mayors’ probability of being revoked and 
increases their probability of being reelected. We formally specify the hypotheses as follows: 
• Mayors that provide a daily collection of MSW have a lower probability of being revoked 
than those that do not offer the service daily, keeping other variables constant. 
• Mayors that provide a daily collection of MSW have a higher probability of being 
reelected than those that do not offer the service daily, keeping other variables constant.  
• An increase in the percentage of dropouts among students in primary school increases 
Mayors probability of being revoked, keeping other variables constant. 
• An increase in the percentage of dropouts among students in primary school decreases 
Mayors probability of being reelected, keeping other variables constant. 
Due to the different incentives associated with the expenditure components and the 
funding sources, the link with electoral outcomes is less straightforward. We would expect a 
positive effect on electoral outcomes for increases in total spending and the opposite effect 
when total spending decreases.  
• An increase in total expenditure decreases Mayors’ probability of being revoked, keeping 
other variables constant. 
• An increase in total expenditure increases Mayors’ probability of being reelected, keeping 
other variables constant. 
In addition, we aim to analyze whether the expenditure components have different effects 
on electoral outcomes. Following the economic classification used for expenditure budgets, we 
distinguished between current and capital expenditure. We specify the hypotheses as follows: 
• An increase in capital expenditure decreases Mayors’ probability of being revoked, 
keeping other variables constant. 
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• An increase in capital expenditure increases Mayors’ probability of being reelected, 
keeping other variables constant. 
Finally, we analyze whether the expenditure funding shares have different effects on 
electoral outcomes. We formally specify the hypotheses as follows: 
• An increases in the portion of expenditures financed with transfers decreases Mayors’ 
probability of being revoked, keeping other variables constant. 
• An increases in the portion of expenditures financed with transfers increases Mayors’ 
probability of being reelected, keeping other variables constant. 
Other variables tested are the political alignment with the provincial municipality (being 
from the same political organization as the provincial municipality Mayor reduces the 
probability of being recalled and increases the probability of being reelected) and gender 
(Female Mayors have a higher probability of being recalled and lower probability of being 
reelected than male Mayors). Also, we include altitude, land area and average household 
expenditures to control for the accessibility, size of the district and economic conditions of the 
district. The summary of the expected effects is shown in Table 1.12. 
1.5 Data and empirical methodology 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the extent to which government performance 
and expenditure structure affect the probabilities of a Mayor of being revoked and reelected. 
For this purpose, we perform a cross-section analysis, which subjects the results to the political 
and economic circumstances at the time of the cross-section observation and the fixed effect of 
the districts. We use a set of control variables to isolate specific features of the districts. The 
Mayor of the district municipality is the unit of analysis. 
The data were obtained from several public organizations: The Ministry of Finance 
(MEF), Ministry of Education (MINEDU), Ministry of Environment (MINAM) and from the 
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National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). The electoral data was collected from 
the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) and the National Election Board (JNE). 
The list of variables that are part of the analysis and their definitions is shown in Table 
1.13 and the summary statistics are shown in Table 1.14. Our sample considers 1,632 district 
municipalities for the period 2011-2014.48 From that group, 1,267 district Mayors (77.6%) 
were not part of the recall process, 276 (17%) were part of the recall process, but not revoked 
and 89 (5.4%) were revoked. Also, 1,020 (62.5%) decided to run for reelection, 319 (31.3%) 
won and 701 (68.7%) lost. 
We consider two measures of performance: The first one is the educational outcomes 
measured as the percentage of students in primary school that drop out; the second one is the 
frequency of the trash collection. To test the effect of the expenditure funding sources, we 
consider the expenses financed with transfers. To test the effect of the expenditure 
components, we consider the capital and current expenditures. 
The first dependent variable is an ordinal variable with a value of 0 if the Mayor is not 
part of a recall process, 1 if the Mayor was part of the recall process but not revoked and 2 if 
the Mayor is revoked. The second dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
the Mayor is reelected and 0 otherwise. We use an ordered logit model to analyze the effect of 
the covariates in the recall process and a Probit binary model to analyze the effect of the 
covariates in the reelection process. Some of the challenges of the empirical methodology are 
the presence of multicollinearity49 and the rejection of the proportionality of odds assumption. 
The details of each model are developed in the following sections. 
                                                 
48 We took out from the sample the municipalities that were created after 2010 and the particular case of a province 
that has only one district. The evolution of the number of districts is shown in Table 1.2. 
49 Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables in the model are approximately determined by 
a linear combination of other independent variables in the model. 
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1.5.1 Probability of being recall 
We use an ordered logit model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the recall process. 
Our dependent variable is revoked (𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖), an ordinal variable with a value of 0 if the 
Mayor is not part of a recall process, 1 if the Mayor was part of the recall process but not 
revoked and 2 if the Mayor is revoked.  
 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 = 𝑥1𝛼 + 𝑥2𝛽 + 𝑥3𝛿 + 𝑥4𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖 1.1 
𝑥1 is a fixed matrix that includes the variables related to performance, daily provision of 
MSW and percentage of dropouts in primary education: 𝑥1𝛼 = 𝛼1𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑖. 
𝑥2 is a matrix that includes the variables related to expenditure. Depending on how these 
covariates are decomposed, we consider four different models: Model 1: natural log of total 
expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and the share of the expenditures 
finance with transfers, 𝑥2𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖; Model 2: natural log of total 
expenditure per capita is divided into current and capital expenditures and the share of the 
expenditures finance with transfers, 𝑥2𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑐𝑢_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖; Model 3: 
natural log of total expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and the natural log 
of total expenditure finance with transfers per capita, 𝑥2𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖; and, 
Model 4: natural log of total expenditure per capita is divided into current and capital 
expenditures and the natural log of total expenditure finance with transfers per capita, 𝑥2𝛽 =
𝛽1𝑐𝑢_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖. 
𝑥3 is a fixed matrix that includes the political variables: 𝑥3𝛿 = 𝛿1𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
𝛿2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑛𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖. Finally, 𝑥4 is a fixed matrix that includes the control 
variables and the intercept: 𝑥4𝛾 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖. 
The ordered logit model assumes an underlying linear relationship that is the same at any 
cut-point. This is called the proportional odds assumption or the parallel regression 
assumption. To test whether this is the case we apply the oparallel command. 
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1.5.2 Probability of being reelected 
We use a Probit binary model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the reelection 
process. Our dependent variable is reelection (𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖), a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
Mayor is reelected and 0 otherwise.  
 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖 = 𝑥1𝛼 + 𝑥2𝛽 + 𝑥3𝛿 + 𝑥4𝛾 + 𝜐𝑖 1.2 
𝑥1 is a fixed matrix that includes the variables related to performance, daily provision of 
MSW and percentage of dropouts in primary education: 𝑥1𝛼 = 𝛼1𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑖. 𝑥2 is a 
matrix that includes the variables related to expenditure. Depending on how these covariates 
are decomposed, we consider two different models: Model 1: natural log of total expenditure 
per capita considered as a single covariate and the share of the expenditures finance with 
transfers, 𝑥2𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖; and, Model 2: natural log of total expenditure per 
capita considered as a single covariate and the natural log of total expenditure finance with 
transfers per capita, 𝑥2𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖.
50 𝑥3 is a fixed matrix that includes the 
political variables: 𝑥3𝛿 = 𝛿1𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑛𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖. Finally, 𝑥4 is 
a fixed matrix that includes the control variables and the intercept: 𝑥4𝛾 = 𝛾0 +
𝛾1ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖. 
In addition, we use a Heckman selection model using the Mayor’s affiliation to a political 
party (rather than other types of political organizations) as instrumental variable to control for 
selection bias. Initially, we do not consider the selection bias and used an ordinal dependent 
variable (𝑅𝐸𝐸3𝑖) with a value of 0 if the Mayor lost 2014 local elections; 1 if the Mayor did 
not run on 2014 local elections; and, 2 if the Mayor was reelected. 𝑅𝐸𝐸3𝑖 = 𝑥1𝛼 + 𝑥2𝛽 +
𝑥3𝛿 + 𝑥4𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖 where 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 represent the same set of matrix introduce for the 
previous model. 
                                                 
50 We test the same four models that were used for the probability to be revoked, but not of the coefficients were 
significant therefore we did not include them in the analysis. 
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1.6 Results 
1.6.1 Probability of being recalled 
The results of the effect of performance and expenditure on the probability of a Mayor to 
be revoked can be seen in Table 1.15 reported as odds-ratios. To test the proportional odds 
assumption in our models we applied the oparallel command; the outcomes confirm the 
relationship is proportional across all the test statistics for the four models (see results in Table 
1.16). The initial analysis included the information about performance and expenditure in a 
yearly format and as an average. However, the challenge of using a yearly format is the high 
correlation among years which undermines the significance of the independent variable. In this 
paper, we show the formats that present higher significance. 
The coefficients of the variables are significant and consistent across the four models. 
The measures of performance (daily provision of garbage collection and percentage of dropout 
among students in primary school) show the expected sign. The measures of expenditure based 
on their components have different effects in the probability of being revoked. While 
increasing total expenses per capita decreases the probability of being revoked; when we 
consider the expenditure by components, increasing current expenses per capita increases the 
probability of being revoked. The political variables confirm the importance of political 
alignment with the upper level of government (Mayor of provincial municipality) and the bias 
against Female Mayors. Also, a higher number of candidates in the elections of 2010 seems to 
reduce the probability of a Mayor of being revoked. Finally, the control variables show that 
less geographic accessibility (measure as higher altitude and bigger territory) decreases the 
probability of being revoked. 
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1.6.2 Probability of being reelected 
The results of the effect of performance and expenditure on the probability of a Mayor to 
be reelected can be seen in Table 1.17.51 The first two columns show the results of the Probit 
model without correcting the selections bias. The next two columns show the results of the 
Heckman Probit model.52 According to the results of the Wald test we reject the null Rho=0; 
therefore, we use the results of the Heckman Probit model.53 Also, as the previous case of the 
probability to be revoked, the analysis consider the information about performance and 
expenditure in a yearly format and as an average. Again, we show the formats that present 
higher significance. 
Both measures of performance show the expected impact in the probability of being 
reelected, but only the first one is significant. From the measures of expenditure based on their 
components, the total expenditure per capita has a significant and positive effect in the 
probability of being reelected, but we did not find different effects based on their components. 
Finally, a higher number of candidates in the elections of 2010 seems to reduce the probability 
of a Mayor of being reelected. The rest of political and control variables were insignificant.  
1.7 Conclusions 
How to manage the money in order to provide goods and services that satisfy the needs 
and preferences of citizens is a general question that runs across different fields. Political 
Science, Public Finance and Budgeting have their approach of who are the main stakeholders 
and mechanism that influence their behavior. According to the literature of fiscal 
decentralization, transferring resources and responsibilities to lower levels of government can 
improve public spending efficiency, partially motivated by the citizens’ political participation. 
                                                 
51 The results of the analysis in which the selection bias is not treated and the dependent variable is an ordinal 
variable is shown in Table 1.18. We use an ordered probit model and a multinomial probit model. We test the 
proportional odds assumption with a LR test. The results shown in Table 1.19 provided evidence that the 
assumption has been violated. 
52 The results for the interest equation are on the top of the table and the selection equation are at the bottom. 
53 Rho is the correlation between the errors of the interest equation and the selection equation. 
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According to the literature of electoral accountability, government performance can be 
improve by providing mechanism through which citizens can reward or punish public officials. 
Finally, the literature of government performance, address the criteria to measure performance 
and to incorporate this information in the decision making process of stakeholders.  
This paper attempts to integrate these fields in order to provide a comprehensive 
empirical analysis of electoral accountability using the case of the Peruvian municipalities. 
The advantage of using a case study is that we incorporate the explanatory effect of the 
variability within the country to analyze the presence of electoral accountability from the 
perspective of the voter. This paper focuses in two mechanisms of electoral accountability: 
recalls and elections. Even though both mechanism follow a similar structure, recalls allow to 
remove elected representatives before the end of their regular term and it requires the proactive 
involvement of voters in collecting the signatures to initiate the recall process.  
The novelty of this paper is providing a case in which both mechanism can be tested. The 
variables to government performance, political environment and accessibility seems to be 
more significant in the Mayor’s probability of being revoked than being reelected. Another 
finding is that voters seem to assign different valuation for the expenses based on their 
components, for the case of probability to be revoked. While increasing the percentage of total 
expenses per capita decreases the probability of being revoked and increases the probability of 
being reelected; when we consider the expenditure by components, the increase in the 
percentage of current expenses per capita increases the probability of being revoked. Despite 
these results, the effectiveness of the recall and election process is still subject of analysis. As 
we noticed before there are cases where a Mayor that was formally revoked had the 
opportunity to run for reelection and win.  
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Table 1.1 Types of performance measures 
 
Type Definition Example 
Inputs Measures of financial and 
nonfinancial resources that are 
applied when providing services.  
The amount spent on road 
maintenance or the amount spent for 
serious crime investigations. 
Process 
/Activity 
Measures of regular activities 
conducted within the 
organization.  
The number of applications 
processed. 
Outputs Measures of the quantity of 
services provided or the quantity 
of service that meets a certain 
quality requirement.  
The number of lane miles of road 
repaired or the number of serious 
crimes reported. 
Outcomes Measures of the results that 
occur, at least in part, because of 
services provided. This may 
include initial, intermediate, or 
long-term outcomes.  
The percentage of lane miles of road 
maintained in excellent, good, or fair 
condition or the clearance rate for 
serious crimes, or the percentage of 
residents rating their neighborhood 
as safe or very safe. 
Cost 
/Efficiency 
Measures of the resources used, 
such as the cost per unit of output 
or outcome. 
The cost per lane mile or road 
repaired or the cost per serious crime 
investigated or per arrest for a 
serious crime. 
Quality 
/Customer 
Satisfaction 
Measures of the quality of the 
outputs/outcomes and/or 
assessment of the quality of the 
service/program by stakeholders.  
The extent to which customers are 
satisfied with an aspect of service 
delivery. 
Explanatory Relating to factors other than the 
services being provided that may 
have affected the reported 
performance. 
The percentage of trucks in vehicle 
traffic or the unemployment rate in 
the community. 
Benchmarks The comparison of performance 
data to other similar entities or 
timeframes.  
Comparing a particular performance 
measure of one of your state 
programs with that same measure 
from a similar program of another 
state government. 
Source: (Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Willoughby, 2004) 
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Table 1.2 Number and population of district municipalities, 2007-2015 
 
Year Number of 
district 
municipalities 
Population 
(average) 
Population 
(standard 
deviation) 
Minimum 
district 
population 
Maximum 
district 
population 
2007 1,639 12,677 43,776 188 922,833 
2008 1,639 12,849 44,644 186 942,619 
2009 1,639 13,021 45,531 185 962,554 
2010 1,643 13,184 46,398 184 983,095 
2011 1,643 13,363 47,304 182 1,000,000 
2012 1,643 13,533 48,019 181 1,000,000 
2013 1,647 13,777 48,805 180 1,000,000 
2014 1,655 13,991 50,712 178 1,100,000 
2015 1,658 14,155 51,424 177 1,100,000 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) 
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Figure 1.1 Number of districts per province 
 
 
Notes: The map shows 194 of the 196 provinces. The data was extracted from the GADM 
database (www.gadm.org), version 2.8, November 2015. The boundary information is for 
statistical data collection and tabulation purposes only. 
Source: INEI 
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Figure 1.2 Situation of territorial demarcation 
 
 
Source: National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS). 
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 Table 1.3 Number of lists that competed in local elections 
 
Number of Lists that competed Election year 
in the local elections 1998 2002 2006 2010 
More than 17  0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 
Between 11 and 17 2.2% 18.3% 9.6% 10.8% 
Between 6 and 10 31.6% 62.4% 57.3% 58.2% 
Less than 6 66.2% 18.5% 32.7% 30.6% 
Number of municipalities 1,811 1,834 1,834 1,834 
Total lists 7,690 14,965 12,747 13,052 
Source: (INFOGOB-JNE) 
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Table 1.4 Recall processes in Peru from 1997 to 2013 
  
1997 2001 2004 2005 2008 2009 2012 2013 
Local authorities 
Part of the process 61 166 187 19 240 67 264 591 
Revoked 42 11 29 11 95 22 69 188          
Regional authorities 
Part of the process 129 462 691 75 999 271 1040 42 
Revoked 93 27 109 42 444 132 400 25 
Source: (ONPE, 2013b) 
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Figure 1.3 Case of a Mayor that was revoked, but was reelected in the next election 
 
 
 
Source: INFOGOB (http://www.infogob.com.pe) 
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Table 1.5 Local government expenditures as a % of GDP, 2004-2014 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Current 
expenditures 1.45 1.37 1.30 1.42 1.56 1.72 1.72 1.69 1.89 1.84 1.82 
Capital 
expenditures 0.91 0.91 1.33 1.34 2.08 2.54 2.40 1.86 2.45 2.63 2.45 
Debt  
service 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 
Total 2.52 2.45 2.73 2.82 3.70 4.33 4.22 3.60 4.40 4.54 4.32 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 1.6 Per capita spending by type of municipality, 2009-2014 (in new sols of 2014) 
  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipality/1 
      
Max 21,868 36,157 17,243 21,866 21,850 20,845 
Min 183 232 255 331 314 353 
CoV 1.48 2.01 1.25 1.20 1.09 1.05 
# of province municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipality 
      
Max 25,825 45,829 37,291 24,815 29,913 33,122 
Min 120 122 110 137 130 128 
CoV 1.18 1.58 1.31 1.12 1.29 1.18 
# of district municipalities 1,622 1,626 1,632 1,637 1,637 1,637 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the district where the provincial municipality is 
located. 
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Table 1.7 Allocation of responsibilities by level of government 
 
  Central government Regional governments Local governments 
Exclusive Foreign relations 
Defense, national security, 
and armed forces 
Justice, with the exception 
of Justice administration 
Internal order, national 
and border police 
Tax administration of 
national scope and 
national public borrowing 
Foreign trade and tariff 
policy 
Regulation of merchant 
marine and commercial 
air transport 
Regulation of public 
services 
Regulation of public 
infrastructure of national 
scope 
Any others set by law in 
accordance with the 
Constitution 
Design and supervision of 
national and sectoral 
policies, which are 
compulsory for all levels 
of government 
Regional development 
plans and executing 
corresponding socio-
economic programs 
Internal organization of the 
regional government 
Promote and implement 
public investment of 
regional scope in roads, 
communications, and basic 
services 
Development of tourism 
circuits 
Administer state land 
within their jurisdiction 
(except municipal land) 
Demarcation of territorial 
limits within the region 
Modernization of small 
and medium enterprises 
Promote sustainable use of 
forestry and biodiversity 
resources 
Urban and rural municipal 
development 
Management and regulation of 
local public services 
Internal organization of the local 
government 
Local development plan 
Execution and monitoring of local 
public infrastructure 
Shared All other responsibilities Education: management of 
education services for pre-
school, primary, 
secondary, and higher 
education (except 
university) 
Public health 
Regulation of economic 
activities in their sphere 
Sustainable management of 
natural resources and 
improving the environment 
Preserving and 
administering regional 
natural reserves 
Culture and arts 
Regional competitiveness 
and job promotion 
Citizens’ participation 
Education: take part in 
management of education services 
as would be determined in the 
sectoral law 
Public health 
Culture, tourism, recreation, and 
sports 
Security (seguridad ciudadana) 
Monument conservation 
Public transport and traffic 
Housing and urban rehabilitation 
Service and management of social 
programs 
Management of social programs 
Waste management 
Source: (World Bank, 2010b) 
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Figure 1.4 Generation of Municipal Solid Waste, 2008-2013 (thousands of tons per year) 
 
 
Source: MINAM-SIGERSOL 
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Table 1.8 Main characteristics of municipal tax revenue assignments 
  
Revenue shares Tax rates  
Districts Provinces 
 
District administration: 
Land and buildings 100% (5% for 
cadaster 
maintenance) 
0% < 15 UIT: 0.2% (or 0.6%) 
15-60 UIT: 0.6% 
> 60 UIT: 1.0%     
Property transfers 50% 50% (to Municipal 
Investment Fund) 
3% (first 3 UIT exempted)  
    
Games (pinball, 
bingo, etc) 
100% 0% 10% 
    
Public shows 100% 0% Bullfighting: 5% 
Horse racing: 10% 
Others: 15% 
Provincial administration: 
Vehicle property 0% 100% 1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT)     
Bets 40% 60% 20% (horse racing: 12%)     
Games (lotteries) 0% 100% 10% 
Notes: The Law Decree No. 776 establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue sources 
for municipalities. There is also a set of national taxes that correspond to the municipalities but 
are collected by the central government which later transfer to them. UIT or “Tributary Tax 
Unit” is a monetary measure used to set the value of taxes, fees, penalties and other legal 
payments equivalent to 3,950 new soles in 2016 (US$ 1,170 on December 24, 2015). 
Source: (Gomez, Martinez-Vazquez, & Sepulveda, 2010). 
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Figure 1.5 Property tax to GDP ratio, Peru and selected comparators 
 
 
Source: (OECD). 
Note: We are comparing the component “4100-Recurrent taxes on immovable property” 
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Table 1.9 Revenue composition of local governments, 2004-2014 (as % of GDP) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Own revenues 0.91 0.91 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.89 
Property tax/0 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.39 
Other tax revenues 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Nontax revenues/1 0.62 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.44 
            
Transfers 1.47 1.65 1.78 2.73 2.66 2.08 2.29 2.52 2.60 2.35 2.19 
Canon/2 0.38 0.66 0.91 1.71 1.53 1.17 1.14 1.37 1.50 1.26 1.08 
FCM 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.86 
Other transfers 0.33 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.09 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.25 
            
Capital revenues/3 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.31 
            
Total 2.53 2.64 2.62 3.67 3.68 3.27 3.41 3.56 3.75 3.45 3.39 
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property. 
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others. 
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights. 
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 1.10 Distribution procedure for the revenues from Canon 
 
Share Beneficiaries Distribution Criteria 
10% District municipalities within which the 
natural resources are exploited 
Equal share 
25% Municipalities of the province within 
which the natural resources are exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
40% Municipalities of the region within 
which the natural resources are 
exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
25 % 80% to Regional Government of the 
region, and 20% to the universities in the 
region 
 
Notes: The criteria are applicable to the revenues collected from the exploitation of mining, gas, 
hydro-energetic, fishing and forest resources (excludes oil canon). The oil canon is governed by 
different rules for the areas of Loreto, Ucayali, Piura, Tumbes, and Huanuco. 
Source: (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2012) and Law No. 27506 (Law on the Canon). 
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Table 1.11 Revenue structure of local governments, 2004-2014 (%) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Own revenues 36 34 28 23 25 30 26 25 25 27 26 
Property tax/0 9 9 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 12 12 
Other tax revenues 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Nontax revenues/1 24 23 18 14 15 18 14 14 14 14 13 
            
Transfers 58 63 68 75 72 64 67 71 69 68 65 
Canon/2 15 25 35 47 41 36 33 39 40 36 32 
FCM 30 30 31 24 25 25 23 22 22 24 25 
Other transfers 13 8 2 4 6 3 11 10 8 8 7 
            
Capital revenues/3 6 3 4 3 3 6 7 4 5 5 9 
            
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property. 
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others. 
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights. 
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 1.12 Expected impact in the probability of being revoked and reelected 
 
Independent variables Probability of being:  
Revoked Reelected 
Performance 
  
Provides daily trash collection service negative positive 
Percentage of dropouts in primary education positive negative 
Fiscal performance   
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer negative positive 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer negative positive 
Log of total exp. per capita negative positive 
Log of capital exp. per capita negative positive 
Log of current exp. per capita uncertain uncertain 
Political variables   
Political alignment negative positive 
Male Mayor negative positive 
Number of candidates uncertain uncertain 
Socio-economic variables   
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp. per capita, 2013 uncertain uncertain 
Log of Altitude (meters above sea level) uncertain uncertain 
Log of Territory (square kilometers) uncertain uncertain 
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Table 1.13 Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variables / Definition Period Source 
Dependent variables 
  
Recall (RECALL): 0 "Mayor was not part of a 
recall process" 1 "Mayor was part of a recall 
process, but not revoked" 2 "Mayor was part of 
a recall process and revoked" 
2012 & 2013 National Office of Electoral Processes 
(ONPE), National Jury of Elections (JNE) 
Reelection (REE3): 0 "Didn't run on 2014 local 
elections" 1 "Didn't win on 2014 local 
elections" 2 "Won on 2014 local elections" 
Elections of 2014 ONPE, JNE 
Reelection (REE): 0 "Didn't win on 2014 local 
elections" 1 "Won on 2014 local elections" 
Elections of 2014 ONPE, JNE 
   
Independent variables   
Performance 
  
Daily trash collection service: 1 "provides 
service daily"  0 "otherwise"  
2010-2014 National Registry of Municipalities 
(RENAMU) 
Percentage of dropouts in primary education 2011-2014 Peruvian Ministry of Education (MINEDU) 
Fiscal performance 
  
Percentage of expenditure financed with 
Transfer (Canon + FCM) 
2010-2014 Peruvian Ministry of Finance (MEF) 
Percentage of expenditure financed with Canon 2010-2014 MEF 
Percentage of expenditure financed with FCM 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer 
(Canon + FCM) 
2010-2014 MEF 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Canon 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of exp. per capita financed with FCM 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of total exp. per capita 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of capital exp. per capita 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of current exp. per capita 2010-2014 MEF 
Political variables 
  
Number of candidates Elections of 2010 ONPE, JNE 
Political alignment: 1 "same political party as 
province municipality Mayor" 0 "otherwise" 
Elections of 2010 ONPE, JNE 
Gender of Mayor: 0 "female" 1 "male" Elections of 2010 ONPE, JNE 
Socio-economic variables 
  
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp. (n.s. per 
capita), 2013 
2013 National Institute of Statistics and 
Information (INEI) 
Log of Altitude (meters above sea level) NA INEI 
Log of Territory (square kilometers) NA INEI 
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Table 1.14 Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Independent variables      
Performance      
Daily trash collection service, 2010 1632 .3008578 0.45877 0 1 
Daily trash collection service, 2011 1632 0.31495 0.46464 0 1 
Percentage of dropouts in primary education, 2011 1632 3.54142 3.07981 0 39.6 
Percentage of dropouts in primary education, 2013 1632 2.21103 2.02930 0 16.7 
Fiscal performance      
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer, 
avg. 2012-2013 
1632 
68.49027 20.20906 0.56375 99.49161 
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer, 
2012 
1632 
70.63025 22.86505 0.93461 99.51012 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer, avg. 
2012-2013 
1632 
6.46304 0.84507 2.67931 10.15982 
Log of total exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013 1632 6.94792 0.69517 4.91394 10.19311 
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013 1632 6.89118 0.73748 4.83551 10.27410 
Log of capital exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013 1632 6.49117 0.88199 2.52453 10.12062 
Log of current exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013 1632 5.73667 0.58888 4.35762 8.93189 
Political variables      
Number of candidates on 2010 local elections 1632 6.88052 2.66270 1 20 
Political alignment 1632 0.29228 0.45495 0 1 
Male 1632 0.96385 0.18673 0 1 
Socio-economic variables      
Log of Household monthly exp., 2013 1632 5.90469 0.36435 4.78458 7.56783 
Log of Altitude 1632 7.12771 1.58405 1.09861 8.44998 
Log of Territory 1632 5.27317 1.42677 0.68813 10.08789 
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Table 1.15 Effect of fiscal and policy variables in probability of Mayors to be revoked 
(OLOGIT-odds-ratio) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
MSW-Daily, 2010 0.719** 0.713** 0.724** 0.719** 
Percentage of dropouts,  1.042** 1.038** 1.041** 1.037** 
primary edu., 2011     
Log of current exp.   1.529***  1.791*** 
per capita, avg. 2012-2013     
Log of capital exp.   0.542***  0.726*** 
per capita, avg. 2012-2013     
Log of total exp.  0.514***  1.001  
per capita, avg. 2012-2013     
Log of exp. per capita financed 2.004*** 1.606***   
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013     
Exp. financed with    1.015*** 1.011*** 
Transfer (%), avg. 2012-2013     
Same pol. org. that  0.716** 0.712** 0.721** 0.714** 
prov. Mayor in 2010     
Mayor-Male 0.545** 0.573* 0.534** 0.567** 
Number of candidates  0.917*** 0.921*** 0.916*** 0.921*** 
in 2010 local elections     
Log of Avg. of HH monthly  0.517*** 0.438*** 0.515*** 0.437*** 
exp. (n.s. per capita), 2013     
Log of Altitude 0.833*** 0.860*** 0.835*** 0.857*** 
Log of Area 0.901** 0.925* 0.910** 0.926* 
Constant cut1 0.00307*** 0.00937*** 0.00971*** 0.0144*** 
Constant cut2 0.0161*** 0.0498** 0.0509** 0.0765* 
     
     
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0345 0.0432 0.0348 0.0441 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: Recall (CPR): 0 "Mayor was not part of a recall process" 1 
"Mayor was part of a recall process, but not revoked" 2 "Mayor was part of a recall process and revoked". 
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Table 1.16 Tests of the parallel regression assumption 
 
 Chi2 df P>Chi2 
Model 1    
Wolfe Gould 13.11 10 0.218 
Brant 11.43 10 0.325 
score 13.31 10 0.207 
likelihood ratio 13.09 10 0.219 
Wald 14.12 10 0.168 
    
Model 2    
Wolfe Gould 14.18 11 0.223 
Brant 13.59 11 0.256 
score 16.26 11 0.132 
likelihood ratio 15.72 11 0.152 
Wald 16.99 11 0.108 
    
Model 3    
Wolfe Gould 12.29 10 0.266 
Brant 10.38 10 0.408 
score 12.34 10 0.263 
likelihood ratio 12.23 10 0.270 
Wald 12.90 10 0.229 
    
Model 4    
Wolfe Gould 13.32 11 0.273 
Brant 11.99 11 0.364 
score 14.41 11 0.211 
likelihood ratio 14.15 11 0.225 
Wald 14.77 11 0.193 
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Table 1.17 Effect of fiscal and policy variables on probability of Mayors to be reelected –
(PROBIT and HECKMAN estimates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 probit- probit heckprobit heckprobit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
MSW-Daily, 2011 0.183* 0.182* 0.110** 0.105** 
 (0.0955) (0.0954) (0.0531) (0.0530) 
Dropouts, primary edu. (%), 2013 -0.0163 -0.0188 -0.0144 -0.0161 
 (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013 0.209***  0.133***  
 (0.0594)  (0.0339)  
Exp. financed with Transfer (%), 2012 -0.00470**  -0.00240**  
 (0.00183)  (0.00102)  
Log of total exp. per capita,   0.364***  0.219*** 
avg. 2012-2013  (0.0998)  (0.0576) 
Log of exp. per capita financed   -0.217**  -0.120** 
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013  (0.0859)  (0.0523) 
Same pol. org. that prov. Mayor in 2010 -0.0296 -0.0203 -0.0151 -0.00982 
 (0.0931) (0.0930) (0.0497) (0.0500) 
Mayor-Male 0.215 0.189 0.0915 0.0916 
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.104) (0.105) 
Number of candidates in 2010 local elec. -0.0654*** -0.0679*** -0.0376*** -0.0376*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0172) (0.00817) (0.00826) 
Log of Avg. of HH monthly  0.281** 0.268** 0.189** 0.180** 
exp. per capita, 2013 (0.131) (0.131) (0.0738) (0.0731) 
Log of Altitude -0.0424 -0.0371 -0.0278 -0.0233 
 (0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Log of Area 0.0289 0.0384 0.0185 0.0240 
 (0.0313) (0.0315) (0.0179) (0.0178) 
Constant -2.910*** -2.886*** -1.418** -1.422** 
 (0.985) (1.000) (0.578) (0.585) 
Selection equation (likely to run for      
reelection)     
Run for 2010 local elections    0.170*** 0.169*** 
with a political party   (0.0497) (0.0498) 
Constant   0.259*** 0.259*** 
   (0.0352) (0.0353) 
Rho     
     
Constant   -5.566*** -5.303*** 
   (1.924) (1.693) 
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0408 0.0378   
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =   8.37 9.81 
Prob > chi2 =   0.0038 0.0017 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE (0=Lost on 2014 local 
elections 1=Won on 2014 local elections). 
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Table 1.18 Effect of fiscal and policy variables in probability of Mayors to be reelected 
(OPROBIT and MPROBIT estimates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 oprobit- oprobit mprobit-Model 1 mprobit-Model 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Didn’t run Won Didn’t run Won 
MSW-Daily, 2011 0.160** 0.161** 0.234** 0.254** 0.235** 0.253** 
 (0.0645) (0.0645) (0.108) (0.118) (0.108) (0.118) 
Percentage of dropouts,  -0.0235 -0.0244* -0.0721*** -0.0248 -0.0719*** -0.0274 
primary edu., 2013 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0236) (0.0258) (0.0236) (0.0258) 
Log of total exp. per  0.120***  -0.0490 0.250***   
capita, 2013 (0.0411)  (0.0692) (0.0742)   
Exp. financed with  -0.00284**  0.00131 -0.00579**   
Transfer (%), 2012 (0.00129)  (0.00218) (0.00231)   
Log of total exp. per   0.220***   -0.143 0.429*** 
capita, avg. 2012-2013  (0.0727)   (0.125) (0.126) 
Log of Exp. per capita  -0.135**   0.106 -0.252** 
financed with Transfer, 
avg. 2012-2013 
 (0.0628)   (0.109) (0.108) 
Same pol. org. that  -0.000813 0.00306 0.0399 -0.0278 0.0366 -0.0178 
prov. Mayor in 2010 (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.103) (0.115) (0.103) (0.115) 
Mayor- Male 0.233 0.216 0.428 0.305 0.436* 0.272 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.263) (0.272) (0.263) (0.272) 
Number of candidates -0.0539*** -0.0557*** -0.0812*** -0.0870*** -0.0798*** -0.0906*** 
In 2010 local elections (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0193) (0.0212) (0.0195) (0.0215) 
Log of Avg. of HH  0.239** 0.232** 0.443*** 0.369** 0.446*** 0.349** 
monthly exp. (n.s. per 
capita), 2013 
(0.0932) (0.0932) (0.155) (0.167) (0.155) (0.167) 
Log of Altitude 0.0107 0.0140 0.265*** -0.0362 0.261*** -0.0308 
 (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0380) (0.0377) (0.0384) (0.0380) 
Log of Area 0.0268 0.0323 0.0605* 0.0399 0.0555 0.0508 
 (0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0365) (0.0392) (0.0369) (0.0395) 
Constant cut1 1.923*** 1.939***     
 (0.700) (0.707)     
Constant cut2 2.979*** 2.994***     
 (0.702) (0.708)     
Constant   -4.496*** -3.794*** -4.410*** -3.746*** 
   (1.171) (1.257) (1.181) (1.271) 
       
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0150 0.0143     
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE3 (0=didn’t run; 1=Run 
but lost; 2=Run and won). 
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Table 1.19 Testing the proportionality of odds assumption using the Likelihood Ratio 
test 
 
Variables (1) (2) 
 omodel omodel 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp.  0.239** 0.232** 
(n.s. per capita), 2013 (0.0932) (0.0932) 
Log of Altitude 0.0107 0.0140 
 (0.0216) (0.0219) 
Log of Area 0.0268 0.0323 
 (0.0218) (0.0220) 
Same political organization that -0.000813 0.00306 
Provincial Mayor in 2010 (0.0619) (0.0619) 
Gender Mayor-Male 0.233 0.216 
 (0.156) (0.156) 
Number of candidates in 2010 -0.0539*** -0.0557*** 
local elections (0.0116) (0.0117) 
Percentage of dropouts,  -0.0235 -0.0244* 
primary education, 2013 (0.0143) (0.0143) 
MSW-Daily, 2011 0.160** 0.161** 
 (0.0645) (0.0645) 
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013 0.120***  
 (0.0411)  
Exp. financed with Transfers (%), 2012 -0.00284**  
 (0.00129)  
Log of total exp. per capita,   0.220*** 
avg. 2012-2013  (0.0727) 
Log of Exp. per capita financed   -0.135** 
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013  (0.0628) 
_cut1 1.923*** 1.939*** 
 (0.700) (0.707) 
_cut2 2.979*** 2.994*** 
 (0.702) (0.708) 
   
Observations 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0150 0.0143 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of equality 
of coefficients across response categories 
chi2(10) =     97.74 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
chi2(10) =     99.45 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE3 (0=didn’t run; 
1=Run but lost; 2=Run and won). 
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2 Improving interjurisdictional equalization 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the goals of fiscal decentralization is to provide equal access to public services 
by citizens regardless of where they live in the country; simultaneously, one of the goals of 
the general government is to reduce poverty and inequality. Accomplishing these goals is 
partly restricted by the challenge of measuring the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of 
subnational governments, particularly in a context of a great disparity. 
An appropriate system of intergovernmental transfers could overcome the vertical54 
and horizontal55 gaps associated with the mismatch between expenditures and revenues. 
Intergovernmental transfers can also compensate the presence of externalities in the 
provision of local public goods; finance those services that are considered priority by the 
central government; and, provide incentives that will promote fiscal effort and efficiency in 
spending. In particular, unconditional transfer mechanisms can either improve the vertical 
fiscal balance by providing general-purpose funding at the subnational level or can improve 
the horizontal fiscal balance by compensating for fiscal disparities across jurisdictions. 
This essay approaches the question of how the allocation method of the two types of 
transfers, described immediately below, affect the fiscal disparities between and within 
subnational jurisdictions. The two types of transfers are (1) revenue-sharing transfers that 
come from natural resource taxes and allocated on a derivation or origin basis; and, (2) 
equalization transfers, specifically the one based on expenditure needs. 
                                                 
54 The expenditure needs of subnational governments arising from their functional competences exceed their 
ability to self- finance them. 
55 It is the result of the different tax capacities and economic bases of subnational governments and also of 
different expenditure needs arising from differences in the costs of service delivery and differences in the 
profiles and needs of the resident population. 
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We examined how the current structure of the Peruvian municipal equalization 
transfer affects the fiscal disparities among the municipalities and how its effect can be 
improved by making adjustments to the current allocation formula. The rest of this essay is 
organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical arguments for the role of 
intergovernmental transfers in reducing fiscal disparities. Section 2.3 describes the main 
characteristics of the fiscal structure of the Peruvian municipalities and examine the fiscal 
disparities by groups of revenue. Section 2.4 presents the main characteristics of the 
Peruvian municipal equalization transfer (also called Municipal Compensation Fund or 
FCM) and describes the variables and the allocation mechanism that are currently used to 
distribute it. Section 2.5 introduces the alternative to allocate the FCM and the 
methodology used to evaluate the current allocation versus the alternative. Section 2.6 
presents the results and Section 2.7 concludes by drawing the lessons learned. 
2.2 Role of intergovernmental transfers 
The three potential economic objectives in providing transfers to subnational 
governments are the internalization of cross-boundary or spillover effects to other 
jurisdictions, equalize tax and/or service capacity across jurisdictions, and to improve the 
overall tax system (Oates, 1999). In most decentralized systems, the expenditure 
responsibilities of subnational governments are not fully covered by their own revenues 
(Garman, Haggard, & Willis, 2001). Fiscal disparities among jurisdictions arise mainly 
from the differences between their fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. Transfers are 
mechanisms to address horizontal disparities, vertical imbalances and to correct for major 
administrative weaknesses and streamline bureaucracy (Schroeder & Smoke, 2003). 56 
                                                 
56 Vertical imbalance happens when the expenditure needs of subnational governments exceed their ability to 
finance them. Horizontal disparities are the result of the different tax capacities and economic bases of 
subnational governments and also of different expenditure needs. 
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However, there is no guarantee that an intergovernmental transfer system will not have 
contradictory effects. In this essay we focus on two specific types of transfers that may 
present the unintended situation: (1) equalization transfers based on expenditure needs; and, 
(2) revenue-sharing transfers that come from natural resource taxes, allocated on a 
derivation basis and earmarked for investment.57 
The rationale behind equalization transfers is to reduce the variation in horizontal 
fiscal imbalances that may exist between subnational jurisdictions in a given country 
(Reschovsky, 2007). This variation can be caused by differences in fiscal capacity58 and/or 
in expenditures needs (or their associated costs)59 that correspond to differences in the 
jurisdictions (Martinez-Vazquez & Sepúlveda, 2008).60 Usually, the equalization formula of 
these transfers measures the “fiscal need” and “fiscal capacity” of each jurisdiction. These 
formulas result in a disproportionate share of the transfers going to those jurisdictions with 
the greatest fiscal need and the least fiscal capacity (Oates, 1999). Although the general 
goal of this transfer is to equalize,61 its operationalization can be diverse, the equalization 
can be based only on expenditure needs or fiscal capacity, or could consider both factors 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 2011b).62  
                                                 
57 Subnational finances in this Latin America generally rely on shared taxes with extensive earmarking (Ahmad 
& Brosio, 2008). 
58 This refers to their economic base which affects their ability to raise a particular level of revenue with 
standard rates and administration effort. 
59 Even when jurisdictions have the same fiscal capacity, they may differ in the costs due to differences in 
demographic profiles, geographical and climatological conditions, incidence of poverty and unemployment 
(Boex & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). 
60 The concepts described previously are formally established in the formula: 𝐹𝐷𝑖 = 𝐸𝑁𝑖 − 𝐹𝐶𝑖, where fiscal 
disparity (FDi) is equal to the difference between expenditure needs (ENi) and fiscal capacity (FCi) (i denotes 
any jurisdiction). If the fiscal disparity of jurisdiction i is positive (negative) then the jurisdiction has less (more) 
funds than required in order to cover its expenditure needs. 
61 Since the objective of this transfer is to “equalize” rather than to affect local priorities, this transfer let the 
subnational governments to spend the resources as they want (Borge, 2010). 
62 Table 2.10 shows the diversity of equalization transfers in terms of their objectives. 
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In the case of transfers by revenue sharing, there are no clear guidelines for the best 
allocation (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). An accepted economic argument for allocating at 
least some of these resources under a geographic criterion is to compensate residents for the 
pollution and environmental damage associated with the extraction of the natural resources. 
However, the location of natural resources is not necessarily correlated with the relative 
expenditure needs or fiscal capacities of the beneficiary governments. This situation creates 
horizontal imbalances which raise inequality between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
(Martinez-Vazquez & Sepulveda, 2011b). This paper focuses on the effect of the 
interaction of these two specific types of transfers on the fiscal disparities among local 
governments by using information of Peru. 
2.3 Fiscal capacity of Peruvian municipalities 
Peru has a population of 31 million as of 2015 and approximately 31% of the 
population lives in the capital city (Lima). The main economic activities are agriculture, 
fisheries, mining, exploitation of oil and gas, and manufacturing of goods. The mining 
industry is the sector with the greatest growth and contribution to the economy regarding 
GDP, exports, and tax input.63 The country is composed of departments (or regions), 
provinces and districts, which are the base for the political demarcation. There are three 
major tiers of government: A national government, 26 regional governments and 1,843 local 
governments (or municipalities). This last tier – the focus of our analysis – is divided into 
196 provincial and 1,647 district municipalities.64 
                                                 
63 The value of mining exports doubled in the 1990s and then rose by more than seven times in the following 
decade. By the early 2010s, the value of Peru’s mining exports averaged nearly 25 billion US dollars, or 14% of 
GDP and over 50% of total exports. Source: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/statistics/annual-tables.html. The GDP per 
capita has expanded from USD 3,311 in 2000 to USD 6,089 in 2016 (values express in constant 2010 US$). 
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=PE.  
64 The number of districts have been increasing the last years, the sample considered for the second paper 
corresponds to the latest information in 2014. 
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The country has been undergoing a decentralization process since 2002 with the 
expectation that it will promote efficiency in the public administration and better-
coordinated policies. Despite the progress in areas like transparency, citizens’ participation 
and transfer of responsibilities, the decentralization process has not enhanced the ability of 
local governments to generate their own revenues or provided the right incentives to 
develop revenue autonomy (Ahmad & García-Escribano, 2011; Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). 
Subsections 1.3.2, 1.3.5 and 1.3.6 in the first essay describe the main characteristics of the 
local governments’ expenditure structure, revenue structure and intergovernmental 
transfers, but as a recap, we address their main characteristics. 
2.3.1 Expenditure structure 
The central government has issued several laws to set the expenditure responsibilities 
of subnational governments, which were assigned shared and exclusive competences. 
However, one of the challenges in the transfer of expenditures responsibilities has been the 
wording of the regulation. Many functions overlap between levels of government and 
provide numerous functions with little clarity in their definition (see Table 2.1).65 Also, the 
requirements for the use of funds on capital expenditures are likely to have a negative 
impact on the efficiency and quality of public services (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013).  The slow 
execution of funds, especially those coming from the exploitation of natural resources, is 
related with the requirement to use those funds for capital infrastructure; the rush to disburse 
has been hurting overall expenditure efficiency (World Bank, 2010b). 
                                                 
65 For example, in the case of education, regional governments have the function to: “formulate, approve, 
execute, evaluate and administer the education, culture, science and technology, sports and recreation regional 
policies for the region” and to “design, execute and evaluate the regional educational project, the culture 
development programs, science and technology, and the sports and recreation development program” while 
local governments function is to: “design, execute and evaluate the educational project of their jurisdiction, in 
co-ordination with the Regional Education Office and the Local Education Management Unit and contribute to 
the national and regional educational policy with an intersectional action focus” (OECD, 2016). 
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2.3.2 Revenue structure 
The fiscal capacity of Peruvian municipalities –understood as the revenues they can 
generate– comes from user charges66 and taxes67. However, local governments do not have 
autonomy to either define the tax bases or set the rates for the taxes assigned them. Therefore, 
local discretion is constrained to the realm of tax administration and enforcement efforts.  
The local taxation exhibits a low efficiency due to the lack of capacity of the 
municipalities. In the case of the property tax, many municipalities do not have a complete 
cadaster of properties or the existing ones are not updated (Alfaro & Rühling, 2007). In 
addition, the structure and administration of the tax offers several exemptions to areas used 
by the public sector, non-profit organizations and for agriculture. Also, it is common 
practice to reduce or forgive penalties to those that do not pay the tax.68 
Table 2.4 shows how in the aggregate, tax revenues are slightly higher than revenues 
from user charges. If we analyze the structure of own revenues per capita, we find a 
significant variation by type of municipality and type of revenue (see Table 2.5, Table 2.6 
and Table 2.7). The coefficient of variation in own revenues (tax and non-tax) per capita 
stands at a rather high level of 2.2 for provincial municipalities and 2.3 for district 
municipalities. If we distinguish between tax and non-tax revenue, we notice that tax 
revenues per capita have bigger disparity (4.2 for provincial municipalities and 4.3 for 
district municipalities) than user charges per capita (1.7 for provincial municipalities and 
2.2 for district municipalities).  
                                                 
66 It includes street cleaning, road tolls, parks maintenance, public safety services, and construction permits. 
67 The Law Decree No. 776 (1993) establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue for provincial and 
district municipalities. Provincial municipalities are assigned the tax on vehicle property, and district 
municipalities are assigned the tax on land and buildings and the tax on property transfers. There is also a set of 
national taxes that correspond to the municipalities but are collected by the central government. The main 
characteristics of the tax revenue assignment can be seen in Table 2.2. 
68 The structure of penalties is the same across municipalities, amounting by law to 50% of the tax due if not 
paid by the deadline; however, municipalities can grant additional discounts.  
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2.3.3 Revenue disparities among municipalities 
We run three regressions to explore the characteristics of municipalities own revenues 
(see Table 2.8). We analyze the revenues as a total and by components (tax or non-tax 
revenues) because of the higher costs and skills associated with the collection of taxes in 
comparison to charges and user fees. This analysis does not attempt to explain the 
determinants of municipalities own revenues, but to understand which variables can predict 
their differences. Considering the heterogeneity of the country, we explore those aspects 
that challenge the provision of goods and services. 
The urbanization rate and the size of the territory are variables used in the assignment 
of the Peruvian equalization transfer under the assumption that both aspects challenge the 
provision of basic services to remote populations. The urban rate has a positive and 
significant association in the three specifications. The same situation happens with the 
territory which is positively associated with tax and non-tax revenues (separately and 
jointly). An interesting finding was the opposite effect of altitude, it shows a negative 
association with tax revenues, but it has a positive association with non-tax revenues.  
Also, the results highlight the structural differences between Lima province and the 
rest of the country. In the same way, provincial municipalities have better fiscal 
performance than district municipalities. We include the log of the average household 
spending per capita and a dummy variable takes the value of one for all districts where 
there was any taxpaying mineral (mainly copper, gold, and silver) production between 
2009 and 2014. Both variables are positive and significant in all the specifications showing 
the fiscal potential of the municipalities. 
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2.3.4 Intergovernmental transfers 
There are two major types of transfers:69 the first type comes from revenue sharing 
arrangements derived from the exploitation of natural resources among the central 
government and subnational governments (Canon). This transfer is not very stable due to 
the volatility of natural resource prices in international markets and its use -which is 
earmarked for capital expenditure. Also, it is allocated on a derivation basis, this situation 
has created administrative pressure in those municipalities that experienced a significant 
increase in the resources and do not have the technical capacity to use them.70 
The second type of transfer is the Municipal Equalization Transfer (FCM) which is 
based on expenditure needs and managerial performance criteria and has the purpose to 
ensure the functioning of all municipalities. Before the implementation of the Canon, FCM 
represented the main source of revenues for most municipalities. However, as a result of 
Peru’s mining boom, the Canon has grown substantially (see Table 2.3).71 
2.4 Municipal Compensation Fund (FCM) 
The Municipal Compensation Fund (FCM) was established in the Peruvian 
Constitution in 1994 with the goal of promoting investment in local governments.72  The 
resources distributed by the FCM are mainly determined by the collection of the Municipal 
Promotion Tax (IPM) which is closely linked to the performance of the general sales tax 
(VAT). In 2010, the authorities changed the FCM allocation methodology to take into 
                                                 
69 More details of the transfers are shown in 1.3.6. 
70 In addition, the beneficiaries have developed a strong sentiment of entitle that could create social tension. In 
2009, the Ombudsman’s office reported 268 social conflicts, of which 38% were related to mining activities 
71 In 2007, the FCM represented 32.9% of districts’ budget and the Canon 21.4% (excluding the Region of 
Lima) (Loayza, Mier y Teran, & Rigolini, 2013).  
72. The article 76 of the Legislative Decree No 776 sets that the IPM is levied at a rate of 2% over the operations 
affected by the VAT. Therefore, the monthly allocation of FCM is directly related to the performance of the tax 
revenue of the previous month; when the revenue increases, the allocation of the following month increases and 
when the levy is reduced, the municipalities receive a lower allocation. 
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account a broader set of unmet needs.73 The goal of this change in the methodology was to 
promote equity in transfers of resources to the municipalities.74 Based on its formula, the 
FCM includes characteristics of a lump-sum grant and also of a matching grant. 
2.4.1 Challenges associated with FCM 
The main concern about transfers is their effect in local governments’ fiscal effort. 
Several studies have been done about this subject in the country, although the results have 
been ambiguous. Earlier studies by Alvarado Perez (1994); Alvarado et al. (2003); Aragon 
and Gayoso (2005) suggest that devolving responsibilities to sub-national governments 
might reduce fiscal effort and deteriorate fiscal balance especially among localities with 
lower fiscal capacity. On the other hand, Rabanal Sobrino and Castillo (2006) suggested that 
transfers can improve the fiscal capacity of local governments; however, the effect seems to 
be lower among those municipalities that receive transfers from Canon. 
More recent studies (Martinez-Vazquez & Sepulveda, 2011a) found a negative 
correlation between the current transfers (FCM) and property tax collections.75 This is later 
confirmed by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2012) who, using different econometric techniques, 
also found a negative and significant correlation between the FCM and tax revenues. On the 
other hand, the transfers from Canon had a positive effect on the level of the non-tax 
component of revenue collections (charges and user fees).76 
                                                 
73 The new methodology includes measures of municipal management such as the fiscal effort of municipalities 
and the extent to which they are prioritizing public investment to allocate funds among different municipalities 
within a given province (Supreme Decree No. 060-2010-EF). 
74 The Government has also created the Incentive Plan to Improve Municipal Management (PI) through Law No 
29332. This plan aims to incentivize Local Governments to improve municipal tax collection levels as well 
spending on investment and reduce chronic childhood malnutrition.  
75 However, they warn about the potential endogeneity bias in the estimates because lower property tax revenues 
per capita may also induce larger current intergovernmental transfers per capita. On the other hand, they also 
found that capital intergovernmental transfers (Canon) are not statistically significant. 
76 They speculate that it might be related to a greater capacity of sub-national governments to provide public 
services for which they can charge and, with greater demand for these services, and/or with greater ability to pay 
on the part of the population. In contrast, revenues from Canon seem to have little or no effect on tax collections. 
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The evidence suggested the presence of perverse incentives created by the equalization 
transfer that comes from not recognizing the municipalities’ fiscal capacities to use their tax 
bases. The potential revenues come not only from the transfers from extractive industries 
(Canon), but also from their economic base. In this context, we reviewed the current 
structure and allocation formula of the FCM and proposed some changes. A 
recommendation that is explored in this essay is the inclusion of the fiscal capacity by 
considering the resources that municipalities received from Canon.77 The idea is to 
significantly reduce the FCM funds from those local governments that receive a significant 
share of the Canon funds. 
2.4.2 Current allocation methodology of FCM 
The allocation of FCM comprises three phases (see Figure 2.1), the first phase 
defines the allocation to the provinces, the second phase defines the allocation to the 
districts and the third phase adjust the allocation that results from the previous steps. 
The first phase is defined as the “Geographical allocation to the provinces” (IGPj). 
The total national FCM “pool of funds” is divided into 196 parts, which are the 196 
geographical provinces that make up the country. The allocation by province uses an 
index combining the population of the province (Popj) and the index of unmet needs for 
public services (ICj) at the province level.
78 The index is calculated as: 
 
𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑗 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 × 𝐼𝐶𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗
196
𝑗=1 × 𝐼𝐶𝑗
 
2.1 
After determining the allocation to the province in the first phase, the next phase is 
the distribution within the province. This is called “Inter-district allocation” (INDk). 
                                                 
77 The term Canon refers to several transfers. The allocation and distribution procedure of these transfers are 
explained in Table 2.9. 
78 The ICj is the simple average of the percentage of people in province j with no access to water (NoWj), 
sewage (NoSj) nor electricity (NoEj).  
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20% of the amount assigned to the province is transferred to the provincial 
municipality79 and the other 80% is distributed among all the districts of the province 
including the district where the provincial municipality is located. It includes 3 factors: 
(i) rurality (IRk); (ii) territorial extension (Terrk); and, (iii) municipal management 
(IGMk).
80 
i) Rurality index (IRk): The index is the weighted summation of the rural (Rurk) 
and urban (Urbk) population of the district (the rural population has a double weight). 
For the districts located in MML and Callao provinces, instead of the rurality index, it is 
used the poverty index based on the population (Popk) and the unmet basic needs (NBIk) 
of the district.81 The corresponding index is: 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑘 =
{
 
 
 
 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘 × 𝑁𝐵𝐼𝑘
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘 × 𝑁𝐵𝐼𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒
1 × 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑘 + 2 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑘
∑ 1 × 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑘 + 2 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
2.2 
ii) Territorial extension index (Terrk): This index aims to compensate districts that due 
to their territorial extension have difficulties providing basic services to their more remote 
populations.82 The formula of the index is: 
 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑘 =
𝐾𝑚𝑘
2
∑ 𝐾𝑚𝑘
2𝑛
𝑘=1
 2.3 
                                                 
79 District where the provincial municipality is located. 
80 Each of these factors represents an index itself that adds one for each province. 
81 The NBIi is the summation of the following indicators: households with inadequate housing (NBI1), without 
access to water service (NBI2), without access to sewage service (NBI3), households with children between 6 to 
12 years old who do not attend school (NBI4) and households with very low economic capacity (NBI5). 
82 The Legislative Decree No. 952 (2004) modified the Legislative Decree No. 776 – Municipal Taxation Law. 
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iii) Municipal Management (IGMk):
83 The index for the district is the simple average 
of two factors that consider the generation of own revenues (ripk) and the prioritization of 
spending in investment (ripgik).
  
 
𝐼𝐺𝑀𝑘 =
𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑘 + 𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑘
2
 
2.4 
The first factor is calculated on the basis of the index of generation of own revenues 
(IPk) which considers the revenues collected on the district in the last two years.
 84 The final 
index ripk is the ratio of IPk relative to the summation of the index for all the districts in the 
corresponding province.  
 𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑘 = [
𝐼𝑃𝑘
∑ 𝐼𝑃𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
]
𝐼𝑃𝑘 = [1 + (
𝑂𝑤𝑟𝑡−1
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡−1
1 + 𝑂𝑤𝑟𝑡−2
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡−2
)]
0.1 
2.5 
Likewise, the second factor is calculated on the basis of the spending prioritization 
index (IPGIk) which considers the acquisition of non-financial assets financed with FCM 
(AnfaFCM) and the total spending financed with FCM in the district (GtotFCM). The final 
index ripgik is the ratio of spending prioritization index relative to the summation of the 
index for all the districts in the corresponding province. 
 𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑘 = [
𝐼𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑘
∑ 𝐼𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
]
𝐼𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑘 = (1 +
𝐴𝑛𝑓𝑎𝐹𝐶𝑀
𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑀
)
 
2.6 
The allocation index for the district set in the second phase is: 
 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘 = 𝐼𝑅𝑘 × 0.85 + 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑘 × 0.05 + 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝑘 × 0.10 2.7 
                                                 
83 The municipal management index is based on the Article 32 of Legislative Decree No. 952 that modifies the 
Legislative Decree No. 776 Municipal Taxation Law. 
84 In the case of the own revenues index (IPk), before the data is converted into an index, a numeric 
transformation is done through which these numbers are converted to a scale between 1 and 2. 
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The third phase adjusts the district allocation to set a “floor value”. The amount 
obtained on the second phase is adjusted to be at least equivalent to 8 tax units. The 
difference between the amount obtained in the second phase and the 8 tax units (UIT) is 
considered a deficit or a surplus, depending on the case. The total surplus is used to fill the 
total deficit and what remains is reassigned to the districts that originally have a surplus 
adjusted by a factor equal to the total sum of surpluses minus the total sum of deficits 
divided by the total sum of surpluses (RA8UIT). In this step, the amount assigned 
exclusively to the provincial municipality is not part of the adjustment.85 With the 
adjustment ratio RA8UIT, we calculate the adjusted monthly allocation FCMk where 
Surplusk (Deficitk) is the positive (negative) difference between the preliminary monthly 
allocation of FCM and 8 UIT in district k and s (d) is the number of districts in surplus 
(deficit). 
𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑘 = {
  8𝑈𝐼𝑇 + 𝑅𝐴8𝑈𝐼𝑇 × 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑘 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠
8𝑈𝐼𝑇                                         , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡
 2.8 
Where: 𝑅𝐴8𝑈𝐼𝑇 =
∑ 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑘
𝑠
𝑘=1 +∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑑
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑘
𝑠
𝑘=1
  
The amount obtained after the 8 UIT adjustment is adjusted again to be at least 
equivalent to the adjusted allocation of FCM on 2009. The adjustment is made following 
the same criteria used to make the adjustment relative to the 8 UIT. In this step, the amount 
assigned exclusively to the provincial municipality (the 20% allocation of the province) is 
also adjusted to be at least the amount assigned on 2009.86 
                                                 
85 This legal “minimum” is established by the Article 33 of Legislative Decree No. 952 which modifies the 
Legislative Decree No. 776 – Municipal Taxation Law. 
86 The index that results from the third phase represents the allocation under a neutral scenario (B). The index 
also includes a pessimistic (A) and optimistic (C) scenario that are adjusted each year. In the case of 2014, the 
scenario A is when the monthly collection is less than 335 million of new soles, scenario B is when the monthly 
collection is between 335 and 373 million of new soles and scenario C when the monthly collection is higher 
than 373 million. The simulation has been performed for scenario B, in other words, the 373 million represents 
the pool of funds to which the index is applied. 
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2.5 Alternative methodology: incorporating fiscal capacity 
As it is set in Figure 2.1, we proposed to include an index called “Fiscal Capacity Gap 
Index” (FCGj) in the first phase. The fiscal capacity is measured by all the transfers funds 
received at the province level (TRj), including the Canon and other transfers of similar 
nature (but excluding the FCM itself) plus potential own revenues which are calculated 
using a regression analysis (𝐼?̂?𝑗). The components are further explained in what follows. 
Transfers: We add all components of the item “transfers” (except for the FCM) 
received by each province. TRj is the total transfers receive by province j, n is the number 
of districts that are part of province j and TRk is total transfers receive by district k. TRk 
represents the summation of all transfers received by district k which includes Canonk; 87 
and other transfers (Othersk).88 
𝑇𝑅𝑗 =∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
2.9 
Where: 𝑇𝑅𝑘 = 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑘 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘  
Estimating potential own revenues: we first calculate actual own revenues for each 
district k, then we estimate the per capita own revenues (IPpck). Owrk and Popk are the 
own revenues and population of district k. 
𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑘 =
𝑂𝑤𝑟𝑘
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘
 
2.10 
Then, in order to estimate potential own revenues per capita we run a regression for 
all districts having as a dependent variable the own revenues per capita IPpck and as an 
independent variable the average household private expenses in each district expressed in 
                                                 
87 Summation of forest canon, gas canon, hydro-energetic canon, mining canon, fishing canon, oil canon and 
sobrecanon, mining royalties and custom duties. 
88 Includes other transfers like FOCAM, FONIE, participations and other transfers. 
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per capita terms.89 We run this regression using the information for 2013, the year for 
which we have the most recent information (see Table 2.11). Subsequently, it is used the 
regression parameter to predict the values of the district own revenues per capita for the 
year of the analysis 𝐼𝑃𝑝?̂?𝑘. In the case that the predicted value is negative, the district is 
assigned a value of zero. 𝐼𝑃𝑝?̂?𝑘 is the predicted value of own revenues per capita of district 
k; 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑘 is the average household private expenses express in per capita terms for 
district k and 𝐼𝑃?̂? is the predicted value of own revenues of district k. 
𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐?̂? = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑝?̂?𝑘 < 0
0.563 × 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑘 − 129.563, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
2.11 
𝐼𝑃?̂? = 𝐼𝑃𝑝𝑐?̂? × 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑘  
To calculate the potential own revenues at the province level, we sum the predicted 
value of own revenues for all districts including the provincial municipality. 
𝐼?̂?𝑗 =∑𝐼?̂?𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
2.12 
The fiscal capacity of the province j is thus defined as the revenues coming from all 
transfers -except FCM (TRj) plus the potential own revenues 𝐼𝑃?̂?: 
𝐹𝐶𝑗 = 𝑇𝑅𝑗 + 𝐼𝑃?̂? 2.13 
𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗 =
𝐹𝐶𝑗
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗
 
2.14 
Calculating the fiscal capacity gap (fcgj): In this step we first calculate the national 
average fiscal capacity per capita (FCpcna) and then we calculate the fiscal capacity gap 
per capita for each province relative to this national average as follows: 
                                                 
89 This approach can be complemented by estimating the municipal own revenues using the provincial measure 
of household spending, plus municipal characteristics such as urbanization, altitude. The focus in this paper is to 
understand the fiscal variation within provinces and between-provinces. 
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𝑓𝑐𝑔𝑗 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑎 < 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗
(𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑎 − 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗) × 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 , 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑎 > 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑐𝑗
 
2.15 
Therefore, only the provinces that have a lower per capita fiscal capacity than the 
national average are eligible for this component of the index. The fiscal capacity index of 
the province (FCGj) is defined as its share in the total fiscal capacity gap of all qualifying 
provinces. 
𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑗 =
𝑓𝑐𝑔𝑗
∑ 𝑓𝑐𝑔𝑗
196
𝑗=1
 
2.16 
Calculating the adjusted allocation index for the province (APIj): The information on 
the fiscal capacity gap index 𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑗  is combined with the original provincial allocation index 
𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑗  to estimate the proposed provincial allocation index. Both criteria are pro-poor and 
other combinations of weights could be simulated to arrive to more (or less) redistributive 
outcomes. We give the original index IGPj a weight of 70% and the added fiscal capacity 
index FCGj a weight of 30%. 
𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑗 = 0.7 × 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑗 + 0.3 × 𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑗 2.17 
2.6 Results 
The paper analyses the fiscal disparities in revenue of local government due to the 
FCM under the current structure and the proposed alternative. The units of analysis are all 
the municipalities that received FCM in 2014. To evaluate the differences between the 
current and alternative allocation methodology of FCM, we estimate the Mean log 
deviation (I0) and the Squared coefficient of variation (I2).  
The alternative methodology proposes province-level indicators for allocation of 
grants to districts; therefore, it ignores the within-province inequality. These measures 
allow to identify the disparities that happen between and within provinces; identify the 
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relative contribution of different revenue sources. In addition, they differ in their 
sensitivity to inequality in different parts of the distribution,  while I0 is most sensitive to 
disparities in the bottom range of the distribution, I2 gives more weight to disparities in the 
upper tail of the distribution (Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2008). 
2.6.1 Disparities in per capita revenue of local governments 
We estimate and decompose the Mean log deviation 𝐼0 = 𝐼0
𝑏 + 𝐼0
𝑤: ∑
𝑛𝑗
𝑁𝑗
(ln ?̅? −
ln ?̅?𝑗) + ∑ ∑
𝑛𝑗𝑘
𝑁
(ln ?̅?𝑘 − ln 𝑦𝑗𝑘)𝑘𝑗  and the Squared coefficient of deviation 𝐼2 = 𝐼2
𝑏 +
𝐼2
𝑤 : 
1
(𝑁−1)?̅?2
∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑗 (?̅?𝑗 − ?̅?)
2
+
1
(𝑁−1)?̅?2
∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑘(𝑦𝑗𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)
2
𝑘𝑗  where N is total population of 
the country; 𝑛𝑗  is population of province j; 𝑛𝑗𝑘  is the population of district k in province j; 
?̅?𝑗 is province j’s mean value of variables 𝑦𝑗𝑘 and ?̅? is the grand mean of variable 𝑦𝑗𝑘. 
We use this structure to estimate I0 and I2 for 4 categories of revenues: own revenues; 
plus transfers; plus other revenues; and, plus FCM (see Table 2.12). The results confirm 
the great differences in per capita revenues before cumulatively adding the transfers and 
other revenues. Most of the disparity occurs within provinces, especially for own-source 
revenues. Even though the disparity is lessened after adding the transfers, the table shows 
the increase in the disparity between provinces. The disparities are lessened after the 
allocation of FCM, mostly on the disparities between provinces.  
2.6.2 Effect of the alternative methodology 
The effect of the inclusion of the fiscal capacity index in the FCM formula depends 
on the application of the no harm measure or “floor value” adjustments done in the third 
phase. With the current formula of FCM, the allocation index (the second phase), changes 
when the floor value adjustments are implemented (third phase). For example, the district 
of Yarabamba (located in the province of Arequipa in Arequipa region) should receive 
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29,560 new sols as a monthly assignment for FCM if we applied the index that results 
from the second phase. However, that amount is less than the 8 UIT and the adjusted 
amount they received in 2009. So in the end, the district receives 30,800 new sols (the 
adjusted amount they received in 2009). 
Our initial alternative (Alt 2.4) only affects the allocation corresponding to the first 
phase; however, after performing the third phase allocation adjustment, it is hard to 
guarantee that the allocation corresponding to the first remains. In order to extend the 
analysis we add three more alternatives that consider the variation in the first phase and 
variations in the application of the third phase. The alternative 2.1 (Alt 2.1) corresponds to 
the case where none of the no-harm criteria is applied; the alternative 2.2 (Alt 2.2) 
represents the case where only the floor value of the adjusted allocation on 2009 is applied; 
and, the alternative 2.3 (Alt 2.3) represents the case where only the floor value of 8 UIT is 
applied. The Table 2.13 shows the disparities in per capita revenues after applying the 
current formula of FCM and the alternatives. All the alternatives seem to marginal lessened 
the disparities between provinces relative to the current formula of FCM; however, they 
also increase the disparities within provinces. 
2.7 Conclusions 
An intergovernmental transfer system is an important component of the fiscal 
decentralization policy; however, it is not immune to present contradictory effects. This 
paper aimed at investigating how revenue-sharing and equalization transfers affect fiscal 
disparities considering the case of Peruvian local governments. Both transfers have a 
significant weight in their budget, but the design of the revenue-sharing transfer -allocated 
on a derivation basis- has caused an increased in the disparity among local governments.  
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Considering the great political cost involved in adjusting the revenue-sharing transfer, 
a possible strategy is to look for an indirect reform by adjusting the equalization transfer. 
The paper investigated whether fiscal disparities among districts can be reduced when the 
allocation formula of the equalization transfer is modified by incorporating a revenue 
capacity component and by removing the “no harmful” adjustment steps.  
The alternatives indicate a reduction in the disparities between and within provinces in 
the lower tail of the distribution (I0), but they increased the disparity within provinces in 
the upper tail (I2). The results are expected considering that the alternatives are meant to 
adjust only the amount that is allocated to the province. Future research can include other 
variables to increase the explanatory power of the model use to estimate the potential 
revenues of the districts as well as considering adjustments in the allocation within the 
province. 
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Table 2.1 Allocation of responsibilities by level of government 
 
  Central government Regional governments Local governments 
Exclusive Foreign relations 
Defense, national security, 
and armed forces 
Justice, with the exception 
of Justice administration 
Internal order, national 
and border police 
Tax administration of 
national scope and 
national public borrowing 
Foreign trade and tariff 
policy 
Regulation of merchant 
marine and commercial 
air transport 
Regulation of public 
services 
Regulation of public 
infrastructure of national 
scope 
Any others set by law in 
accordance with the 
Constitution 
Design and supervision of 
national and sectoral 
policies, which are 
compulsory for all levels 
of government 
Regional development 
plans and executing 
corresponding socio-
economic programs 
Internal organization of the 
regional government 
Promote and implement 
public investment of 
regional scope in roads, 
communications, and basic 
services 
Development of tourism 
circuits 
Administer state land 
within their jurisdiction 
(except municipal land) 
Demarcation of territorial 
limits within the region 
Modernization of small 
and medium enterprises 
Promote sustainable use of 
forestry and biodiversity 
resources 
Urban and rural municipal 
development 
Management and regulation of 
local public services 
Internal organization of the local 
government 
Local development plan 
Execution and monitoring of local 
public infrastructure 
Shared All other responsibilities Education: management of 
education services for pre-
school, primary, 
secondary, and higher 
education (except 
university) 
Public health 
Regulation of economic 
activities in their sphere 
Sustainable management of 
natural resources and 
improving the environment 
Preserving and 
administering regional 
natural reserves 
Culture and arts 
Regional competitiveness 
and job promotion 
Citizens’ participation 
Education: take part in 
management of education services 
as would be determined in the 
sectoral law 
Public health 
Culture, tourism, recreation, and 
sports 
Security (seguridad ciudadana) 
Monument conservation 
Public transport and traffic 
Housing and urban rehabilitation 
Service and management of social 
programs 
Management of social programs 
Waste management 
Source: (World Bank, 2010b) 
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Table 2.2 Main characteristics of municipal tax revenue assignments 
  
Revenue shares Tax rates  
Districts Provinces 
 
District administration: 
Land and buildings 100% (5% for 
cadaster 
maintenance) 
0% < 15 UIT: 0.2% (or 0.6%) 
15-60 UIT: 0.6% 
> 60 UIT: 1.0%     
Property transfers 50% 50% (to Municipal 
Investment Fund) 
3% (first 3 UIT exempted)  
    
Games (pinball, 
bingo, etc) 
100% 0% 10% 
    
Public shows 100% 0% Bullfighting: 5% 
Horse racing: 10% 
Others: 15% 
Provincial administration: 
Vehicle property 0% 100% 1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT)     
Bets 40% 60% 20% (horse racing: 12%)     
Games (lotteries) 0% 100% 10% 
Notes: The Law Decree No. 776 establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue sources 
for municipalities. There is also a set of national taxes that correspond to the municipalities but 
are collected by the central government which later transfer to them. UIT or “Tributary Tax 
Unit” is a monetary measure used to set the value of taxes, fees, penalties and other legal 
payments equivalent to 3,950 new soles in 2016 (US$ 1,170 on December 24, 2015). 
Source: (Gomez et al., 2010). 
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Table 2.3 Revenue composition of local governments, 2004-2014 (as % of GDP) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Own revenues 0.91 0.91 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.89 
Property tax/0 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.39 
Other tax revenues 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Nontax revenues/1 0.62 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.44 
            
Transfers 1.47 1.65 1.78 2.73 2.66 2.08 2.29 2.52 2.60 2.35 2.19 
Canon/2 0.38 0.66 0.91 1.71 1.53 1.17 1.14 1.37 1.50 1.26 1.08 
FCM 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.86 
Other transfers 0.33 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.09 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.25 
            
Capital revenues/3 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.31 
            
Total 2.53 2.64 2.62 3.67 3.68 3.27 3.41 3.56 3.75 3.45 3.39 
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property. 
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others. 
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights. 
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 2.4 Revenue structure of local governments, 2004-2014 (%) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Own revenues 36 34 28 23 25 30 26 25 25 27 26 
Property tax/0 9 9 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 12 12 
Other tax revenues 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Nontax revenues/1 24 23 18 14 15 18 14 14 14 14 13 
            
Transfers 58 63 68 75 72 64 67 71 69 68 65 
Canon/2 15 25 35 47 41 36 33 39 40 36 32 
FCM 30 30 31 24 25 25 23 22 22 24 25 
Other transfers 13 8 2 4 6 3 11 10 8 8 7 
            
Capital revenues/3 6 3 4 3 3 6 7 4 5 5 9 
            
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
/0 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land and buildings property. 
/1 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines and others. 
/2 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties and concession rights. 
/3 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 2.5 Own revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014) 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipalities/1       
Max 2,822 3,328 3,695 4,428 3,823 3,589 
Min 3 3 3 0 5 0 
St. Dev 247 276 299 361 404 366 
Average 118 129 131 146 173 165 
CoV 2.09 2.14 2.28 2.47 2.34 2.22 
# of provincial municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipalities       
Max 5,414 4,766 2,566 2,954 2,995 3,182 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 223 243 183 193 215 219 
Average 75 85 81 86 95 95 
CoV 2.96 2.86 2.26 2.25 2.27 2.31 
# of district municipalities 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality 
is located. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 2.6 Tax revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014) 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipalities/1       
Max 1,398 1,794 1,963 2,362 2,527 2,418 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 103 133 146 176 245 223 
Average 26 32 35 41 55 53 
CoV 4.01 4.11 4.13 4.35 4.45 4.20 
# of province municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipalities       
Max 5,039 4,642 1,206 1,435 1,512 1,620 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 138 156 73 79 93 93 
Average 16 21 18 19 22 22 
CoV 8.50 7.49 4.11 4.14 4.24 4.26 
# of district municipalities 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality 
is located. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 2.7 Non-tax revenue per capita by type of municipality (in new sols of 2014) 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipalities/1       
Max 1,425 1,534 1,732 2,066 1,855 1,347 
Min 2 2 2 0 4 0 
St. Dev 171 173 174 219 227 194 
Average 92 97 95 106 118 112 
CoV 1.85 1.78 1.82 2.07 1.93 1.74 
# of province municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipalities       
Max 2,958 3,218 2,193 2,458 2,020 2,338 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 146 160 138 145 152 157 
Average 59 64 63 67 73 73 
CoV 2.47 2.49 2.19 2.17 2.09 2.16 
# of district municipalities 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 
/1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality 
is located. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 2.8 Characteristics of local governments own revenues, 2014 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Log of Total own 
revenue per capita 
Log of Tax 
revenue per capita 
Log of Non-tax 
revenue per capita 
    
Log of average household spending per capita, 2013 1.782*** 2.334*** 1.477*** 
 (0.121) (0.0962) (0.121) 
Producing Districts 0.853*** 0.210** 0.893*** 
 (0.116) (0.0919) (0.116) 
Provincial municipality 0.213* 0.644*** 0.228** 
 (0.110) (0.0874) (0.110) 
Lima province 0.919*** 0.927*** 0.909*** 
 (0.229) (0.182) (0.229) 
Urban rate (%) 0.00984*** 0.00454*** 0.00909*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00115) (0.00145) 
Log of Area (square kilometers) 0.163*** 0.0320 0.170*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0201) (0.0254) 
Log of Altitude (meters) 0.127*** -0.210*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0186) (0.0235) 
Constant -9.448*** -11.44*** -8.316*** 
 (0.785) (0.622) (0.786) 
    
Observations 1,843 1,843 1,843 
R-squared 0.308 0.578 0.248 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables are express in log. The US Dollar to Peruvian new sols 
exchange rate on December 2014 was as 1 USD = 2.9798 new sols. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, INEI 
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Figure 2.1 Current and alternative methodology to distribute the FCM 
 
 
Note: The box in light blue represents the proposed adjustment to incorporate fiscal capacity 
in the formula. 
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Table 2.9 Distribution procedure for the revenues from Canon 
 
Share Beneficiaries Distribution Criteria 
10% District municipalities within which the 
natural resources are exploited 
Equal share 
25% Municipalities of the province within 
which the natural resources are exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
40% Municipalities of the region within 
which the natural resources are 
exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
25 % 80% to Regional Government of the 
region, and 20% to the universities in the 
region 
 
Notes: The criteria are applicable to the revenues collected from the exploitation of mining, gas, 
hydro-energetic, fishing and forest resources (excludes oil canon). The oil canon is governed by 
different rules for the areas of Loreto, Ucayali, Piura, Tumbes, and Huanuco. 
Source: (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2012) and Law No. 27506 (Law on the Canon). 
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Table 2.10 Equalization goals, allocation factors and international practice 
Source: (Boex & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007) 
 
Goals Factors Country examples 
Enable similar 
levels of service 
affordability 
Expenditure needs 
indicators (separately or in 
a combined indicator), or 
national expenditure 
standards 
 
India, Italy, Nigeria's Federation 
Account, South Africa's Equitable 
Shares, Spain, Uganda's 
Unconditional Grant. 
Enable similar 
levels of fiscal 
resource 
availability 
Fiscal capacity 
indicators or 
representative revenue 
system 
 
Canada's Equalization Grant. 
Enable similar 
levels of service 
at similar levels 
of taxation 
Fiscal gap = Expenditure 
needs − Fiscal capacity, or 
some other combination 
of needs and capacity 
 
Australia, China, Germany, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Russia, UK, Netherlands’ 
Municipal Fund, Uganda's 
Equalization Grant. 
Distribution on an 
equal per capita 
basis 
Population Some transfers in Canada, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, and 
England. 
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Table 2.11 Estimation of per capita total revenues per district 
 
Variables IPpc_k 
  
Gtoavgpck 0.563*** 
 (0.0286) 
Constant -129.6*** 
 (12.69) 
  
Observations 1,819 
R-squared 0.176 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.12 Disparities in local governments revenue (per capita) within and between 
provinces, 2014 
 
 
Own-
source 
Plus 
transfers 
Plus other 
revenues 
Plus 
FCM 
Square coefficient of variation (I2) 6.623 3.569 3.204 1.974 
Within provinces 6.039 1.708 1.723 1.074 
Between provinces 0.584 1.861 1.481 0.899 
     
Mean log deviation (I0) 1.005 0.578 0.590 0.408 
Within provinces 0.598 0.316 0.361 0.251 
Between provinces 0.413 0.262 0.229 0.155 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 2.13 Changes in disparities in local governments revenue (per capita) within and 
between provinces using the alternative allocations of FCM, 2014 
 
 Plus FCM Alt 2.1 Alt 2.2 Alt 2.3 Alt 2.4 
Square coefficient of variation (I2) 1.974 1.945 1.968 1.960 1.967 
Within provinces 1.074 1.113 1.117 1.119 1.117 
Between provinces 0.899 0.833 0.851 0.841 0.850 
      
Mean log deviation (I0) 0.408 0.366 0.375 0.371 0.375 
Within provinces 0.251 0.234 0.237 0.236 0.237 
Between provinces 0.155 0.133 0.139 0.135 0.138 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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